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EARL LAniAM*
The Cement case of 1948 was decided in April of that year.' It outlawed a more
or less obvious form of price fixing by conspiracy to use a basing point system in
forbidden ways. The case aroused an immediate controversy and a din of conflict-
ing counsels was raised. Few cared or dared to attack the principal holding directly.
Many said they saw in dicta a covert menace to free and independent enterprise.
It was asserted that the law now required all sellers to quote prices f.o.b. mill, and
that it inhibited every enterpriser from ever meeting the lower price of a competitor.
By December, 1948, a former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission was
moved to say of this view, that he had to agree with Mr. Bumble: "If the law sup-
poses that, the law is a ass, a idiot"2
This essay concerns itself with the drive to have Congress take legislative action
to "clarify" the law which was assumedly made unclear by the Cement case of
1948. The movement began with the creation of the Capehart Committee in the
closing months of the Second Session of the Eightieth Congress, and ended in stale-
mate (perhaps only temporary) in the closing days of the First Session of the Eighty-
first Congress. The sequence of events provides an excellent case study of the way
in which public policy was formulated in a controversial and technical field where
strong and weighty interests have vested.
I
OvMRTURE TO THE CAPEHART COMMITTE
Representatives from the great steel state of Pennsylvania acted quickly after the
Cement case of 1948. Both Representative Francis E. Walter and Senator Francis
S. Myers introduced bills in the House and Senate respectively to provide a mora-
torium on further proceedings under the decision and to authorize an investigation
of its effects Senator Capehart of Indiana, however, had also introduced a reso-
lution to investigate the impact of the Cement decision on consumers and business.4
*Joseph B. Eastman Professor of Political Science, Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948).
"Robert Elliott Freer, Let's Stop Kicking the Anti-Trust Laws Around, remarks prepared for dcliv-
cry before the Sales Executives Club of New York, Roosevelt Hotel, New York City, December 7, 1948.
N. Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1948, p. 49, col. 2. Some currency had been given to this view by another
member of the Federal Trade Commission, Lowell Mason. See remarks of Lowell B. Mason before the
Boston Conference on Distribution, Boston, Mass., Oct. 26, 1948. A statement released to the press
in the name of the Federal Trade Commission, however, denied that the law forbade freight absorption
or prevented meeting competitor's prices. See FTC, NoTICe To THm STAFf, IN RE: ComissioN PoLIcy
TowARv GEOGRAPHIc PRICING PACTICES (October 12, 1948).
'H. R. 2222 and S. zoo8, 8ist Cong., rst Sess. (1949); 95 Cong. Rec. 9168 (July 6, 1949).
'S. Res. 241, 8oth Cong., rst Sess. (1948), introduced by Senator Capehart and referred to the
Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94 Cong. Rec. 6158 (May x8, 1948); reported
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Since the Walter, Myers, and Capehart resolutions all provided substantially for the
same thing, a conference was arranged between Walter, the majority floor leader
(Halleck of Indiana), and the chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary to
clear the brief tangle. Representative Walter in the House agreed not to press his
resolution in that body and withdrew in favor of the Senate hearing which had
been authorized by the Capehart resolution. If the House and the Senate had run
hearings on the same subject at the same time, there would undoubtedly have been
a duplication of witnesses and testimony.5
The reaction of the steel industry to the Cement case was at first mixed, with
opinion divided as to next steps for steel.6 The Cement case had outlawed con-
spiratorial use of a multiple basing point system of delivered prices among cement
companies. The chairman of United States Steel said that its subsidiary, Universal
Atlas Cement Company, would comply with the Court's order. The big question
was whether the Court's decision affected the use of basing point formulas in
pricing steel. Some wanted to await the outcome of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's case against the manufacturers of rigid steel conduit, and others wanted to
press for Congressional legislation immediately, to protect the steel industry's pricing
system, even though the question of its legality was then in the processes of liti-
gation. By June, x948, there were strong rumors that the steel industry would press
for legislation to protect the basing point system in steel. It was the opinion of
Senator Morse that the steel industry intended not merely to have the existing law
"clarified" but to validate the basing point system in steel, whatever the meaning
of the existing law.7
The point is of some importance because Senator Capehart repeatedly asserted
that the existing law was so confused that clarification was necessary, and that
businessmen should be informed by Congress that it was legal and proper for them
to absorb freight in quoting prices to buyers. This was also the official theory of
the O'Mahoney Bill which was introduced in the First Session of the Eighty-first
Congress, and which will be discussed more fully below! It is difficult, if not
impossible, to ascertain with exactness the intention of the steel industry in this
matter, but there is certainly a sense in which it could be argued that the trouble
with the existing law was not that it was unclear, but that it was becoming pain-
fully clear, and that the hope of practitioners of the basing point system was not to
clarify the trend, but to reverse it? Some supporters of the O'Mahoney Bill at
least thought they were making basing point systems safe.10
with amendments (SEN. REP. No. 1566) and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration,
94 Cong. Rec. 7501 (June 4, 1948); reported back, 94 Cong. Rec. 7949 (June io, 1948); passed Senate
as amended, 94 Cong. Rec. 7949 (June io, 1948).
5 95 Cong. Rec. 7949 (June io, 1948).
' For a description of these events, see speech of Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, 95 Cong. Rec.
762-T769 (May 31, 1949).
7 95 Cong. Rec. 763 (May 31, 1949).
s See pages 292 if. infra.
'For a good statement of the meaning of the law, see Note, 58 YALE L. J. 426 (1949).
o See remarks of Representative Crawford of Michigan on the floor of the House: "... if the
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On July 7, 1948, United States Steel abandoned the basing point system of deliv-
ered prices and changed to f.o.b. mill.1' Although the steel industry was not re-
quired by the Cement case to go f.o.b., 2 and although the steel industry was shown
by one witness to have gone on an f.o.b. basis before the Cement case in some in-
stances,' 3 the impression became fairly widespread that the Supreme Court had
forced the steel producers to require their customers to pay the freight. 4 It is
interesting that although the steel industry (which was not involved) seemed to feel
it necessary to go f.o.b., one of the respondents in the Cement case, according to its
attorney, continued to sell cement priced and delivered at destination. 5 The new
policy of United States Steel raised the price of steel several dollars a ton.'0 Accord-
ing to one of the witnesses before the House Small Business Committee in the
summer of 1949, the change to f.o.b. pricing actually made the cost to the steel com-
panies go down $i.oo a ton.'7 A professor of political economy at Johns Hopkins
University termed the steel company action an "attempt to deceive the consumers
basing point system is done away with, in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Court, then
I think we will have worse conditions from the standpoint of the expansion of monopolies and the
destruction of small enterprise....." 95 CONo. REC. 9164-9i65 (July 6, 1949). And further, "I
see nothing whatsoever in the basing point system which destroys competition." Ibid. See also remarks
of Representative Walter of Pennsylvania, in which he said that the opponents of the O'Mahoney bill
are those who oppose basing point systems. Id. at 9168. At another place Representative Walter said
that the bill did not "reestablish" the basing point system but failed to answer directly whether it
prohibited basing point systems from being reestablished. Id. at 9169. The Department of Justice repre-
sentative, testifying before the House Judiciary Committee, referred to the bill as basing point legislation
without rebuke. Hearings before Subcommittee No. z of the House Committee on the Judiciary on
S. zoo8, 81st Cong., ist Sess. 13 (1949) (hereinafter cited as H. R. Hearings on S. zooS).
"' The Wall Street Journal quoted an unidentified manufacturer as saying, "The pressure on Con-
gress to pass legislation making freight absorption a legal business practice probably will be terrific as a
result of United States Steel's action. For a lot of steel users, it means higher prices; many toes will be
pinched. Apparently steel officials felt they couldn't win their price case before the courts, so they're
using this means to take it to the people." Waif Street Journal, July 8, 1949, p. 1, col. 6. Fortune
said two months later, ". . . as a general rule business has far more to gain through placing its faith
in the slow interpretation of law by the courts than in political action. The latter is apt to yield more
confusion and bitterness. The former, however difficult, can give the kind of continuity that makes
industrial democracy possible." Fortune, September 1948, p. 79.
12 See Corwin Edwards, New England Council Speech, September 18, 1948: "The Commission has
no authority to require businessmen to sell f.o.b. mill or to impose upon them any other specific pricing
practice."
"
5 Testimony of Otis Brubaker, United Steelworkers of America, CIO, in Hearings before a Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. zoo8, 8ist Cong., xst Sess. so (1949) (hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings on S. ioo8). The Senate Small Business Committee report, "Changes in Dis-
tribution of Steel," accepted by Wherry and Martin, shows the same thing. Hearings, supra, at 2o.
See reaction of Senator Myers in Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on S. 236, 81st Cong., ist Sess. 221 (1949) (hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings
on S. 236).
" See the census of views taken by the National Small Business Men's Association, in Hearings before
a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. Res. 24z, 8oth
Cong., 2d Sess. 30-49 (r948) (hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on S. Res. 24r), where some of those
answering thought that the Supreme Court had specifically forced the steel industry into its action.
1 1 Testimony of Edward A. Zimmerman, in Senate Hearings on S. 236, at 247.
1 6 Testimony of Otis Brubaker, Senate Hearings on S. 236, at 195. Mr. Coyle estimated the increase
at $9 a ton. See note 17, infra.
' Statement of David Cushman Coyle, in Hearings before the House Select Committee on Small
Business, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 97 (949) (hereinafter cited as Small Business Committee Hearings).
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by telling them that freight absorption was unlawful and that delivered prices were,
therefore, necessarily higher than before."'
Whatever may have been the motivation behind the decision to adopt f.o.b.
pricing, the effect upon the customers of steel producing companies was rapid, loud,
and insistent. A clamor was raised for legislative action, which the steel companies
encouraged by direct solicitation.19 There was also evidence that dissident customers
were reluctant to identify themselves because they might be disciplined by their
suppliers.2° The Washington correspondent of the Rocky Mountain News discov-
ered a public relations firm that had been hired at a compensation of at least $Iooo
a month and expenses to get the law amended. According to his account, a National
Competitive Committee was established with local chapters, and agents were sent
about the country to organize others. The firm is said to have stood ready to per-
form such jobs "as delivering to a client a ready-made nation-wide grass-roots organ-
ization." Of this attempt to manufacture pressure, Senator Morse said:21
This lobbying effort was one of the best organized, one of the most heavily financed, and
one of the most adroitly deceptive that has ever been addressed to the Congress of the
United States.
II
THE CAPEHIART HEARINGS
With beaters in the states flushing the thickets, witnesses winged their way to
Washington where they gave testimony to the Capehart Committee. 2  The Com-
mittee officially consisted of Hawkes of New Jersey and Brewster of Maine on the
Republican side, and Johnson of Colorado and McMahon of Connecticut on the
Democratic side, with Capehart of Indiana as chairman. The major work of the
Committee was done by the chairman and the general counsel, while the other
members participated, presumably, as their busy schedules permitted. The stated
purpose of the Senate resolution under which the Committee functioned was to
inquire into existing legislation concerning government policy affecting the activities
of the Federal Trade Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission, and
the impact of these policies as interpreted by the Supreme Court "with particular re-
28 Statement of Professor Fritz Machlup, id. at 2r4.
"o Speech of Senator Wayne Morse, 95 Cong. Rec. 7163 (May 31, x949). The forms of solicitation
included suggestions by salesmen to customers that Congress be asked to legalize basing point practices,
statements by company officials to the press, and letters by company officials to customers urging pressure
upon Congressmen. See 95 Cong. Rec. 11575 (Aug. i, 1949) for further details about the public
relations program. See also letter from Ben Moreell, President, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,
July 21, 1948, to shareholders and employees, announcing new pricing policy and need for action by
Congress. 95 Cong. Rec. 11585 (Aug. 12, 1949). Ernest T. Weir, Chairman of the National Steel
Corporation, followed a similar course. 95 Cong. Rec. 11585 (Aug. 12, 1949).
"0 95 Cong. Rec. 764 (May 31, 1949). A garden toolmaker was said to have made a price reduc-
tion of one per cent but feared reporting it because of the possibility of the loss of steel allocations.
Even larger reductions were named by other manufacturers but fear of trade reprisals prevented them
from declaring themselves. N. Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1948, p. 45, col. 2.
22 95 Cong. Rec. 765 (May 31, 1949).
" The title of the Capehart Committee was Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on S. Res. 241.
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lation to the basing point or freight equalization system of pricing."' 3 The Com-
mittee was also to study the effect of the continuance or discontinuance of these
pricing policies on the consumer and small businessman. In addition, it was charged
with the duty of exploring the character and extent of industrial concentration in
the United States. 4 The resolution establishing the Committee was adopted on
June 12, 1948, and on July 30 the Committee resolved to concentrate its first efforts
upon the impact upon the economy of the new basing point law as interpreted and
administered by the Federal Trade Commission and the courts. It never did get
into the character and extent of industrial concentration in the United States.
In August, 1948, the Committee appointed an advisory council to aid it in the
inquiry directed by Senate Resolution 241. Under the direction of a chairman,
forty-five people were invited and participated in the deliberations of the council.
The council met three times and made a final report to the Committee recommend-
ing modifications in the law for the relief of the business community. A repre-
sentative of the National Farmers Union, who was a member of the council and
who attended all of its meetings, found it objectionable because of its composition.25
Of the original members of the council, he said, there were three executives of the
cement industry, whose case had started the entire controversy; a representative of one
of the respondents in the Glucose cases of 1945; and three representatives of steel com-
panies who were respondents in a Federal Trade Commission case. There were
also seven representatives of customers of the cement and steel industries. Trans-
portation was represented by a representative of the railroads, which benefit under
basing point schemes. There were no representatives of the trucking industry which
does not benefit under basing point schemes. No representative was known as a
strong anti-monopolist, nor were there representatives from government depart-
ments or agencies concerned with the enforcement of the antitrust laws. Of the
labor representatives, one was the head of the Cement Workers Union, and one
(United Steelworkers) withdrew. Of the farm groups, only two were originally
represented-the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Grange.
The National Farmers Union was added at the instigation of Senator Johnson of
Colorado. 0 Congressman Patman of Texas repeated the observation of the National
Farm Union representative that,2"
The inclusion of representatives of three great farm organizations can be accounted for
only on the theory that their interest in the basing point problem had not been publicly
2'SSTuDY OF FEDERAL. TRADE COMMISSION PRICING POLICIES, INTERIM REPORT, SEN. Doh. No. 27, 8st
Cong., ist Sess. 1 (1949) (hereinafter cited as SEN. Doc. No. 27).
"The Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission objected that with $15,ooo and a deadline of
March 15, 1949, nothing like the investigation authorized by S. Res. 241 could be achieved. Statement
of Robert E. Freer. Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, to a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. Res. 241, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. I (June 2, 1948)
(mimeographed).
"
5 Statement of Angus McDonald, in Small Business Committee Hearings, at 75 fi. The Committee
was also described by Otis Brubaker of the United Steelworkers as a basing point business committee,
although he did not suggest that it was deliberately "stacked." Senate Hearings on S. 236, at 222.
"Small Business Committee Hearings on S. zoo8, at 76.
27 95 Cong. Rec. 9162 (July 6, 1949). Cf. Small Business Committee Hearings on S. tooS, at 80.
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expressed in recent years and that their devotion to the policies of the antitrust laws was
underestimated.
None of the farm organization representatives agreed with the majority report of
the advisory council.2 s
The center of the Committee's activities, however, was in the Committee itself. 9
Its stated object was to inquire into the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in
the Cement case upon consumers and small businessmen. Even this was an im-
possible goal, for the time was too short for any reliable indication of effect to
make itself apparent. As the friendly Senate Report on the hearing stated:30
Although many business witnesses appeared before the subcommittee and testified as to
the harmful effects of required f.o.b. mill selling, it does appear that sufficient time
has not yet elapsed to determine the actual effect on the cement, steel, and other indus-
tries in which that pricing practice has been adopted.
The inability of the Committee to obtain the information which it presumably was
established to obtain did not prevent it, however, from compiling a record of some
1,400 pages, most of it representing, to use the language of the Senate Report, "con-
clusions of witnesses as to what would happen to their respective businesses if f.o.b.
mill pricing was required of all industry."'" Instead, therefore, of amassing testi-
mony upon the effect of the Supreme Court decisions upon the economy, the sub-
committee posed a fictitious situation (every enterpriser selling f.o.b. mill) and
made a record of responses. There was no documented assertion that the existing
law actually required anyone to adopt f.o.b. mill pricing.
The witnesses before the Committee represented steel customers,3 2 cane and
beet sugar growers and refiners whose products were sold on a delivered price
basis,33 candy and glucose manufacturers, 31 including some under complaint by the
Federal Trade Commission, cement customers,3 5 building materials manufacturers
and dealers,36 cement producers, 7 steel producers, 8 railroad traffic spokesmen,39
pulp and paper producers,' ° some officials of the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission,41 spokesmen for trade associations in lumber,4 gro-
28 Id. at 63. The American Farm Bureau Federation neither approved nor disapproved the majority
report. The National Grange and the National Farm Union representatives wrote minority reports.
" The Committee hearings were held on November 9, 1o, II, 12, 16, 17, 18, 39, 29, and 30;
December 6, 7, and 8, 1948.
o SEN. Doe. No. 27, at 35.
I11d. at 36.
22 Senate Hearings on S. Res. 241, at 255, 71, 259, 282, 285, 305, 323, 743, 786, 1075, 1236.
"Id. at 564, 583, 592, 6o6, 61o, 641.
"Id. at 624, 625, 627, 1046.
2 01d. at 647, 657, 667, 672, 676, 3235.
20 Id. at 52, 55, 292, 662, 679, 683, 774.
27 Id. at 776, 843, 852.
SId. at 262; Pittsburgh Steel Co., id. at 505; Inland Steel Co., ti. at 5t4, 526, 540, 1259.
"Id. at 896, 1188, is98.
oId. at 1012, 1034, 1038, 1049, 3055.
"Id. at 96, 111, 327, 342, 694, 790, I347.
"Id. at 768.
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ceries,a3 and other commodities, small business association representatives, 44 and
representatives of the Army,45 Navy,40 and other federal agencies4 7 A scattered
representation from assorted enterprises appeared,4" and some minor public officials.
Three unions were represented, one of which was a small union in the cement
industry49 and another in railroads. ° All three were from industries representing
basing-point interests, or benefiting from basing point systems. None of the major
unions appeared, although telegrams and statements were sent by several locals.
None of the principal farm organizations appeared. Big steel and cement pro-
ducers were notably absent. At one point in the hearings, Senator Capehart threat-
ened to subpoena companies in the steel industry but the threat turned out to be
a request for letters answering the question whether the steel companies would
return to a freight absorption sales policy "if permitted by Congress so to do."
51
They thought they might.
One of the most interesting and important visitors was Senator Joseph O'Mahoney
of Wyoming, who appeared in the company of Robert D. Pike, a spokesman for
the Westvaco Chemical Company, Westvaco, Wyoming. 2 Mr. Pike testified that
his firm was interested in developing trona deposits in Wyoming for the purpose
of producing soda ash, and that the entire investment would amount to some
$25,000,ooo.1 3  He testified that his investment might be endangered if he did not
have assurance that he would be permitted to absorb and equalize freight with any
competitor any place in the United States.54 Senator O'Mahoney had long been
interested in developing this chemical industry in his state as a conscientious repre-
sentative of Wyoming, and his appearance with Mr. Pike is evidence of the zeal
with which the distinguished Senator concerned himself with the affairs of his
constituents.
The hearing was a good show, with numerous witnesses to supply a chorus of
protest under the direction and leadership of Senator Capehart. Although he re-
peatedly asserted that he wanted the facts about the effect upon industry of required
f.o.b. pricing (which the law did not require), few were cross-examined except
witnesses from the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of justice, an
economist from the University of Washington, and a small business group repre-
"
8 id. at Io6x, I162.
"Id. at 29, i16, 1227, 1240.
'
5 1d. at 85, 923.
"Id. at 928.
' Reconstruction Finance Corporation, id. at 885; Bureau of Federal Supply, id. at 917, 921; Agri-
culture, id. at 933.
" Id. at 64, 277, 296, 356, 534, 561, 631, 762, 875, 90I, 912, 980, 996, 1079, 1159, 1172, 1210,
1221, 1254, 1261.
United Cement, Lime and Gypsum Workers, id. at i9, 1148.
"Order of Railway Conductors, id. at 12o6; Glass Bottle Blowers Association of the United States
and Canada, id. at 971.1
r1d. at 1374.
'
2 Id. at 949.
Id. at 955.
"Ibid.
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sentative, all of whom testified either that the law didn't require f.o.b. pricing or
that they thought that it would be a good idea if it did. Harmony prevailed in
the relations between the subcommittee, its chairman, and all other witnesses. With
the skill of a conductor on the podium, Capehart led witness after witness (once
their prepared statements were out of the way) through a series of questions that
made it appear that enterprisers were confused by the existing law, that they had
no place to go in the government for a definitive answer, and that it was necessary
for Congress to come to their rescue and write legislation on the subject. He was
his own best witness, and he spoke to the record through many voices. He finally
worked himself around to the view that the Cement case of 1948 was a boon to
United States Steel,r5 the larger steel companies, and big business,56 and that he
was defending the little businessman, presumably by "forcing" the steel industry
to stop f.o.b. pricing. 7 The representative from Inland Steel lent a hand to this
piece of dramaturgy by saying that f.o.b. pricing would be to the advantage of the
steel industry but that he opposed it because it would stifle competition and lead
to monopoly. 8  One of the more imaginative speculations about the consequences
of required f.o.b. pricing was Capehart's suggestion to a witness that it was injurious
to health, because more people would be poisoned by "smog" created by concen-
trated industries-concentration being an alleged consequence of required f.o.b.
pricing.'a
In matters of substance, the Capehart hearings produced a potpourri of para-
doxes and contradictions. Big business wanted new legislation but small business
enterprisers argued their case for them. The normal competitive advantage of low
freight cost (nearness to mills) was represented as offensive monopoly. The indus-
try wide system of uniform delivered prices which lends itself to the curtailment of
price competition under conditions of conspiracy or conscious parallelism, was called
competition. It was argued that local monopolies would be produced unless a pricing
system which produced national monopolies was restored. Although all producers
offer the same buyer one price under some forms of the basing point delivered
price system, the Federal Government was assumed to be doing the same thing
when it sells stamps for three cents everywhere, even though the Federal Govern-
ment is one producer charging the same price to every buyer. Little business asked
the Congress to "permit" them to employ a system (freight absorption) which works
to their disadvantage more often than to their advantage since, by being small, they
often do not have the resources to compete in a national market. In the interest
5 51d. at 341.0Id. at 347.
" Id. at 563. See also Senate Hearings on S. 236, at 224, where Senator Capehart said that he
thought "that the big steel industries would welcome a law making it illegal to sell on any other than
f.o.b. basis." If one assumes with Senator Capehart that the FTC and the courts already required f.o.b.
pricing, it would appear that the steel companies should have supported the Federal Trade Commission.
The record does not indicate such support.
1 8Senate Hearings on S. Res. 241, at 514 fi.
Id. at 510. On this point the colloquy concluded as follows: "Senator Capehart. So we might
add health. Mr. Beeson. I would like to add health."
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
of clarity, the Capehart Committee laid the foundation for new legislation that
would take years to litigate.
One jarring note in the proceedings was supplied by the persistent off-stage
racket of Congressman Wright Patman of Texas, who took a disrespectful view
of the entire affair. The Senator from Indiana heckled the Congressman from
Texas, in absentia, when a Texas steel producer testified that he was confused by
the law on pricing, that the uncertainties of the law should be cleared up, and that
Congress should do the clearing.6" Capehart and the steel man agreed that the
steel man knew more about steel than Congressman Patman.0 ' The Democratic
National Committee made releases of some of Congressman Patman's charges that
the subcommittee was a big business committee and that the hearings were a not
too covert attack upon the antitrust laws. The rumor got about that the Demo-
cratic National Committee itself would make an official statement at the behest of
the "high policy makers in the Democratic Party," but Senator McMahon scotched
the rumor. 2 Capehart finally took official notice of the activities of Congressman
Patman by inserting into the record a release bearing the heading of the Publicity
Division of the National Democratic Committee 3 The release contained the text
of Congressman Patman's charges, with many citations from the press, including a
Wall Street Journal report of an interview with a leading steel company president
to the effect that a multitude of steel customers would get farther than a few big
steel companies in the movement to change the law. 4 Capehart made an attack
upon Patman in the hearing, charging him with making misstatements, and with
being unfair. The advisory committee, he said, was not "stacked" but had been
selected because of the knowledge of the members of the subject. Capehart specially
mentioned the union and farm representatives. He was particularly annoyed by the
Patman statement, issued after the election in November, 1948, that,6
If Republicans had gained control of Congress and the Presidency, the anti-trust laws
would have been repealed in 30 days and organized greed would have been in complete
charge of the country.
This piece of political extravagance seemed to produce a stronger reaction than it
deserved. Senator Capehart waved it in front of a subsequent witness who said
appropriate and soothing things. 0
III
THE EVOLUTION OF S. 236
The election undoubtedly had some influence upon the plans of those who
wanted Congress to write new legislation on the subject of pricing policies. 7 With
60 Statement of Ralph L. Gray, id. at 540-541.
Id. at 556-557. "21d. at 1133-1'34. "3Id. at xx66 f.
6
'Id. at 1167. " Id. at 117r. " Id. at 1242.
67 See excerpt from Newsweek, November 29, 1948, reprinted in id. at 1257.
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a change in the political complexion of the House and the Senate, the committee
memberships were reshuffled and Capehart lost his chairmanship 8 Those who
assumed that the subcommittee would be making its report to a friendly and well
disposed Congress were faced with a Congress of unpredictable temper. As events
showed, however, the movement to write a new law went far in the new Congress
and, indeed, was halted only by the tireless efforts of a small group of Senators led
by Kefauver of Tennessee, Long of Louisiana, and Douglas of Illinois.
Before any report could be made to the Senate on the original Capehart Reso-
lution (S. Res. 241), Senator Capehart, and Senator Johnson of Colorado who suc-
ceeded Capehart as chairman of the subcommittee, introduced a bill on January 5,
1949 to make permanent amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act and
the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. The bill was referred
to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce which proceeded, through
the subcommittee headed by Johnson, to hold hearings6 At the least, this effort
to secure permanent legislation before the investigating committee had reported
showed haste, and justified the feeling that the sponsors were in an unseemly hurry.
The bill of Senator Johnson was understood by Secretary of Commerce Sawyer
to have the purpose of "preserving the existing status of regulation as businessmen
generally understood it to be prior to the opinion in the Cement Case."" It had
taken almost eleven years to get the Cement case decided. 1 While regulation
walked with tortoise speed, relief from regulation was to fly on wings.
The proposed bill would have amended the Federal Trade Commission Act by
outlawing any price fixing conspiracy or combination. This was surplusage since
they were already illegal under the Cement case and other cases. In the absence
of such agreement or conspiracy, no pricing practice was to be deemed an unfair
method of competition because the delivered price was uniform on goods of like
quality and grade, or was similarly uniform within any geographical zone, or ab-
sorbed freight. Practices tainted with fraud, deception, or coercion were denied
the benefit of the amendment. The justifications available to a seller charged with
practicing discriminatory pricing under the Robinson-Patman Act were increased.
Prices lower than those of a competitor were exempted from the prohibitions of
the Act where the differential was customary in the general price relationships of
the respective products or "otherwise justified by the competitive situation of the
" Senator Johnson took over Senator Capehart's job as chairman on January 3, 1949. See Senate
Hearings on S. 236, at 223. This did not mean a change in leadership, however, for the record shows
that Senator Capehart did most of the talking on the Subcommittee side after the reshuffle.
"o Senate Hearings on S. 236, at a. The hearings were held for only three days in January and one
day in February. The February meeting was held for the purpose of amending S. 236 before trans-
ferring jurisdiction over the bill to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
o Id. at 5.
" Secretary Sawyer in no way proposed that the decision in the Cement case as it related to con-
spiracy was to be modified. Ibid.
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two or more sellers." 2 The authority of the Federal -Trade Commission to require
remedial action to dissipate the effects of a conspiracy was expanded.
Two people from federal agencies who had testified in the Capehart hearings
appeared to testify in the brief hearings on S. 236."a Some new witnesses appeared
to express a point of view different from the standard patter of confessed confusion,
helplessness to choose acceptable pricing courses, and desire for Congressional re-
lief.74 Business groups, of course, were represented, among them being the Cham-
ber of Commerce,7" the National Canners Association,"0 National Retail Lumber
Dealers Association,7 7 and local and state chambers and industrial associations.7
Counsel for food and private truck owners associations,"0 the American Bar Asso-
ciation,o and private witnesses8 ' expressed the hope that Congress would do what
was called for, although the witness for the truckers and the food dealers thought
that Congress should be careful8 2 The chief witnesses, however, were the chair-
man of the Interstate Commerce Commission who wanted references to his agency
stricken, 3 a group of witnesses from the Federal Trade Commission, and the re-
search director for the United Steelworkers of America.
In the course of the questions put to the chairman of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, it appeared that the questioners seemed less interested in the witness'
problem than in trying to make it appear that the Interstate Commerce Commission
promotes freight absorption 4 in order to encourage competition. The ICC on
occasion permits blanket rates in order to allow sellers in two parts of the country
to compete in the same market from which they are not equidistant. This pro-
duces a version of freight absorption in as much as the price to the consumer is not
"Ild. at 3-
" These were Herbert A. Bergson, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice, id. at 74, and Allen C. Phelps, lawyer and Chief of the Export Trade Division of the
Federal Trade Commission, id. at 6o.
"'Among the new groups were the United Steelworkers of America, represented by its Research
Director, Otis Brubaker, id. at 185, and the National Farmers Union represented by Angus MacDonald,
Assistant Legislative Secretary, id. at 136. The National Grange appeared through J. T. Sanders, id.
at 243.
7 Id. at 168.
I01d. at 33.
"Id. at 55.
78Id. at rSi, 131, II.
"id. at 235.
SId. at 49. See also American Bar Association resolution in support of Congressional intervention,
id. at 316.
" 1d. at 176, 163.
"I1d. at 236.
"
5 He was concerned lest one of the stated policies of the bill--"to foster competitive private enter-
prise by the treatment of transportation costs in interstate commerce so that access to distant markets
may be available, when economically feasible, to any competing seller'--be construed to alter the juris-
diction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. He felt that it would be difficult for the Commission
to determine economic feasibility and that it would lay a ground for attack upon its decisions by "dis-
appointed litigants who might charge that they were denied access to distant markets by the Commis-
sion's action." He suggested that the reference to the Interstate Commerce Commission be deleted and
indicated that he thought that the basic legislation under which the ICC operates adequately provided
for consideration of the element of competition in rate making. Id. at 7-9.
" Id. at 14-15.
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the sum of the cost of production and shipping. Commissioner Mahaffie refused
to say that this practice was the same as freight absorption with which the Sub-
committee was concerned, in spite of insistent prodding by Senator CapehartP5
He did express his personal view that the "prohibition of any (i.e., all) absorption
would be disturbing to business.""6  Capehart chose to regard this answer as an
endorsement of his effort to prevent the Federal Trade Commission from requiring
all sellers to adopt f.o.b. pricing, which was the theme of the Capehart hearings,
but was not the law as it existed, nor the express policy of the Federal Trade
Commission.
The witnesses from the Federal Trade Commission were Ewin L. Davis, Com-
missioner, and a group of Commission lawyers.87 Missing from this group was
Walter Wooden, Associate General Counsel of the Commission, who in the hear-
ings on S. :241 had been subjected to a stiff cross examination by Senator Capehart
and counsel for the Capehart Committee because he felt that f.o.b. pricing, although
not the law, was desirable policy. The first presentation was made by Commis-
sioner Davis, who took note of widespread misapprehensions that had followed the
Cement case in April 1948, but thought that the misapprehension was abating 8
He made the suggestion that Congress, by refusing to change the existing law,
would do much itself to abate such confusion as might remain 9
Since the original drive to change the law was supposed to have been caused
by the confusion among businessmen and their lawyers as to the meaning of the
law and the intentions of the Federal Trade Commission, Commissioner Davis
proceeded to show that the Commission had issued statements in explanation on
two occasions and stood ready to issue further ones to clear up still obscure mat-
ters. ° In its reply to the questions put by the Chamber of Commerce of the State
of New York, dated January 12, 1949, the Commission had refused to say that all
basing point systems were violations of the law, or to predict all of the circum-
stances in which conspiracy might be proved. The Commission was specific in
saying that it did not advocate required f.o.b. pricing.?' In his testimony, Com-
missioner Davis was equally specific in saying that a seller could absorb freight
or absorb part of his manufacturing costs or any other costs in order, in good faith,
"
5 Id. at z5-8.
I hd. at 21.
Allen Phelps, Assistant Chief Trial Counsel and Chief of the Export Trade Division of the Federal
Trade Commission; Robert B. Dawkins, Special Legal Assistant to the Federal Trade Commission; and
Joseph E. Sheehy, Associate Director of the Bureau of Legal Investigation of the Commission.
" Id. at 23.
80 Ibid.
"' FTC, NOTICE TO THE STAFF, IN R: CossiosSON PoLICY TowARD GnooAsmsc PsuciNG PRAst cEs
(Oct. 12, 1948); FTC Release, Letter from Commission to Secretary of Chamber of Commerce of State of
New York, January 12, 1949. Senate Hearings on S. 236, at 24.
D" Commissioner Davis was emphatic in pointing out that "The Commission has not in a single case
challenged the use of the basing point method of pricing per se, separate and apart from collusion. The
Commission has not challenged freight absorption per se. The Commission has not required f.o.b. mill
pricing. The Commission has not challenged the legality of the use of uniform delivered prices by an
individual concern." Senate Hearings on S. 236, at 24.
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to meet an equally low price of a competitor. 2 As to the proposed legislation, he
was of the view that it was neither necessary nor desirable. 3 Commissioner Davis
later gave to the Subcommittee the views of a majority of the Commission on fifty-
four questions dealing with Commission policy.94 Apart from the propriety of
using a public hearing to force from a quasi-judicial agency an assurance as to future
policy, the Commission statement should have been sufficient clarification for all
but the willfully self-confused.
Commissioner Davis commended to the attention of the Subcommittee two FTC
lawyers who had been requested to appear (Sheehy and Dawkins)."5 Both expressed
objections to S. 236. Dawkins echoed the view of Commissioner Davis that the
rash of uncertainties was subsiding under the influence of public discussion, and
that S. 236 would not reduce uncertainty but would increase it by the use of new
and ambiguous concepts and words that would require long litigation." Another
lawyer, however (Phelps), contradicted Commissioner Davis,07 thought that there
was a drive to impose f.o.b. pricing on all sellers,"' and felt that Congress should
act.° The chairman of the Subcommittee thanked him for his "scholarly
presentation."' 00
Differences of view expressed by the witnesses from the Federal Trade Com-
mission, however, lent leverage to the Subcommittee in its claim of excessive uncer-
tainty and confusion arising out of the Cement case. In the Interim Report to the
Senate on S. 236, the contradictory statements of the FTC witnesses were laid end
to end, and pronounced "confusing." '' They were actually made to appear more
confusing than they would have been, had the Subcommittee heeded the explanation
made by Commissioner Davis. He later pointed out that all of the individuals
had been invited in their personal capacities, that they had so testified, and then
said: 02
The Commission regards difference of opinion among staff members and even among
Commissioners as a normal incident of the development of policy and of the interpreta-
tion of law; and believing that responsible interpretations of public questions contribute
to the understanding thereof, the Commission is unwilling either to require all staff
members to express only its official views or to muzzle all staff members who think for
themselves.'0 3
" Id. at 25.
"
5id. at 26.
"Id. at 268-278. These replies constituted a clear answer to legitimate questions of doubt about
the policies and expectations of the Commission.
0
Id. at 27.
90Id. at 97.
I71d. at 65.
'
81d. at 66.
I90 d. at 67.100 Id. at 69.
..1 SEN. Doe. No. 27, at 46 ft.
102 Senate Hearings on S. 236, at 275.
... The reference to disagreements among the members of the Commission is documented by the
record of the hearings on S. 236. On February x8, 1949, Senator Johnson wrote to Commissioner
Lowell Mason, who replied March 2, 1949 that he wished to express his disagreement from the majority
of the Commission on matters before the Congress. Id. at 337-338.
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It may be said at this point that the Subcommittee under both Capehart and
Johnson seemed interested in obtaining assurances that the Commission would not
press the enforcement of the law rigorously in the directions which the Supreme
Court had indicated were open. Capehart had previously referred to meeting with
representatives of the Commission for the purpose of coming to some understand-
ingY' 4 At the time of the hearings on S. 236, however, the record did not show
that such an understanding had been negotiated and much, therefore, was being
made of the contradictions. Subsequently the Subcommittee took credit for pro-
ducing mollifying disclaimers by the Commission and for the Commission's accept-
ance of the views of Commissioner Davis,' °5 although even then it was still felt
necessary to enact legislation to be sure that the Commission did not backslide.
One of the most thoroughly prepared presentations made to the Johnson Com-
mittee was that of Otis Brubaker, research director for the United Steelworkers
of America.00 It offered evidence, instead of speculation, that the effects of the
Cement case allegedly feared were not taking place. Throughout the entire thirty
districts of the USWA "we found not one single basic steel plant or one steel-
fabricating plant which had been shut down because of the pricing change."'0 7
In the questioning of Brubaker after his direct statement, however, there was no
effort to test the validity of his findings. Rather, Capehart undertook to swoop
him off into the empyrean of speculation-to a fictitious world where the only
pricing alternative is required f.o.b., to a realm "where the big steel industries would
welcome a law making it illegal to sell on any other than f.o.b. basis.' 0" The con-
clusion is permissible that the Subcommittee was more interested in proving its
case than in hearing it refuted.
There was a hiatus between the third and the fourth of the four days of hear-
ings on S. 236, a hiatus of about three weeks. In this period of time a change in
strategy took place. Senators Johnson and Capehart were still pushing for perma-
nent legislation, and Johnson instructed subcommittee counsel to revise the bill.
Subcommittee counsel met with Commissioner Davis, who reportedly instructed
the Federal Trade Commission staff to collaborate with subcommittee counsel in
the preparation of a revised bill. Johnson approved the revision and told Commis-
sioner Davis that he would accept the revision and try to get it through Congress
"if the Commission formally approved the bill.""' Commissioner Davis replied
that the Commission opposed any legislation, and that it would not approve the
bill. An amended S. 236 was nevertheless prepared. It was said by the chairman
... Senate Hearings on S. Res. 241, at ioii.
"o SEN. Doc. No. 27, at 63.
... Senate Hearings on S. 236, at s85 fh. The record of the study and the testimony of the repre-
sentative of the United Steelworkers was of importance in as much as it supplied some of the basis
for the attack upon the movement to obtain Congressional relief which was made by Senator Wayne
Morse. 95 Cong. Rec. 762, 764 (May 31, 1949).
'" Senate Hearings on S. 236, at 202.
10 Id. at 224.
10 SEN. Doc. No. 27, at 69-70.
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of the Subcommittee to have embodied the advice of Assistant Attorney General
Bergson at many points1 °
In the amended bill, the references to the Interstate Commerce Commission
which were uncongenial to the chairman of that body were eliminated. Provisions
of the bill would have made it harder for the Federal Trade Commission to prove
any violation of the antitrust laws in the absence of conspiracy, and even the value
of some of the evidence that would tend to prove conspiracy was reduced. The
original aim of the bill was intact and indeed strengthened, to wit, to enact a
permanent amendment to the antitrust laws on the basis of the Capehart testimony,
which was largely ex parte, and the three days of hearings under the nominal chair-
manship of Senator Johnson.
Iv
THE MYERs MoRAroiuuM
Although S. 236 had been amended as a result of the hearings, the effort to get
it adopted was abandoned" 1 and support was given instead to a bill which Senator
Myers of Pennsylvania had introduced before the hearings on S. 236 were finished:
a bill to provide a legislative moratorium. 12 This bill, S. ioo8, was referred to the
Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, of which the Johnson-
Capehart Subcommittee was a part. Under the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946, amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act were put under the juris-
diction of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, while amendments
to the Clayton Act were under the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary.
Ten days after the hearings on S. 236, Senator Johnson introduced a resolution to
transfer jurisdiction of both S. 236 and S. ioo8 from the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce to the Committee on the Judiciary, and this was approved
by the Senate' 13
... Id. at 64-69, pasm.
... Several factors led to this change in strategy. First, the Subcommittee had failed to get Federal
Trade Commission approval of the proposed legislation. This failure to approve could have lessened
the chances of passage. Second, Assistant Attorney General Bergson in a speech before the New York
City bar on February 17 had said that he had opposed S. 236 because it provided permanent regulation
of a subject then being adjudicated, but indicated that he would not be adverse to a moratorium that
would permit Congress time to develop satisfactory permanent legislation, if any should be found to
be needed. Id. at 71. Third, it appeared that considerable time might pass before Congress would
adopt S. 236, if it ever did. The chances of getting a quick moratorium that would produce the same
result for a shorter time then appeared to be qutie attractive.
"'Representative Walter of Pennsylvania introduced a similar bill in the House at the same time,
H. R. 2222. In a speech to the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, Senator O'Mahoney
said that S. 236 was abandoned because "so uncertain were the members of the committee of what
the effect of that bill would be that they decided not to report it and instead to report a bill which was
called the 'moratorium bill.' " 95 Cong. Rec. A4 289, A429o (June 28, x949). The clarifiers in short
were confused.
.SS. Res. No. 76, 95 Cong. Rec. z615 (Feb. 28, 1949). According to Senator O'Conor of Mary-
land, the moving spirit in the transferring of jurisdiction was Senator McCarran of Nevada. 95 Cong.
Rec. 756 (May 3P, 1949).
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Before any hearings were held on the Myers Bill (S. ioo8), the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce made an Interim Report to the Senate on the
original Capehart hearings, the hearings on S. 236 as amended, and on S. 1008314
The Interim Report, which more nearly resembled a thesis than a report, was an
argumentative attack upon the Federal Trade Commission. Attention was given
to the plight of those who, under required f.o.b. pricing, would not be able to relo-
cate their plants or build a $300,000,000 steel mill.1 5 Out of pages of testimony by
the United Steelworkers representative, the part which the authors of the Interim
Report salvaged was a statement saying that a straight f.o.b. system was as unde-
sirable as a straight basing point system. The same witness also said that the law
did not require f.o.b. pricing, and that no legislation, therefore, was needed to
allow freight absorption. On the other hand, a considerable amount of space was
given to the testimony of the small number of unions who were basing point
beneficiaries. There were tears for the proverbial victims of government regula-
tion, "the small investor, widow, or orphan" who would "have unpleasant surprises
with no fair warning."11  The ambiguous surprises were evidently related to an
asserted stock market decline in the securities of companies struck foul by the
pricing policy which the Federal Trade Commission said it was not enforcing.
Various statements of the staff of the Commission were examined for inconsistency
with pedantic fidelity. Painstaking research was evident in the historical exposition
of the Commission's well-known view that conspiracy is a bad thing and that
basing point systems lend themselves to violations of the antitrust laws. The good
faith of the Commission was challenged in the statement that,llr
The Commission's present disclaimer of any intention to require f.o.b. mill selling, and
current confusion as to the legality of competitive freight absorption, may be examined
in the light of this historical background.
Although no hearings had as yet been held on S. ioo8, the hope was voiced that
S. ioo8 would be passed immediately by Congress" 8 while further consideration
was given to S. 236.
There were three days of hearings on S. ioo8 at the end of March and the first
of April, 1949. The bill itself was very simple."9 The intent was disclaimed to
... SEN. Doc. No. 27, 8ist Cong., ist Sess. (1949).
... Id. at 21.
... Id. at 27.
117 d. at 45.
118 Id. at 72.
1"' See Senate Hearings on S. zoo8, at i. Section , of the Myers bill declared "that it has not been
the intent of the Congress to deprive individual companies of the right to use delivered price systems
or to absorb freight to meet competition in any or all markets, provided such activities are carried on
independently and in good faith, and not through any combination or conspiracy in violation of the
Sherman Act as amended." Section 2 provided as follows: "Until the expiration of two years after the
enactment of this Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, and the Clayton Act, as amended,
shall not be construed as depriving individual companies, in the absence of conspiracy or combination
or other agreement in restraint of trade, of the right to independently use delivered price systems or to
absorb freight to meet competition in any and all markets." Section 3 provided that "Nothing herein
contained shall affect any proceeding pending in any Federal court of the United States on February r,
1949."
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deprive individual companies of the right, independently, to use delivered price
systems or to absorb freight to meet competition in any and all markets, provided
good faith was present and conspiratorial design was absent. One part of the bill
provided that for two years the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton
Act (both as amended) should not be construed as depriving individual companies
of the right, independently, to use delivered price systems or to absorb freight to
meet competition in any and all markets, so long as there was no conspiracy or
combination to restrain trade. The scene of action was now the Subcommittee of
the Committee on the Judiciary, and the cast of characters had changed. The three
members of the Subcommittee were McCarran of Nevada, O'Conor of Maryland,
and Wiley of Wisconsin.
The Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on S. loo8 were notable chiefly be-
cause the CIO as an organization appeared for the first time to object to the rate
and the direction in which the move to write legislation was proceeding; the Fed-
eral Trade Commission took a clear position through one spokesman; and several
members of Congress also testified. The spokesman for the CIO was the research
director for the United Steelworkers of America who had appeared in the hear-
ings on S. 236.12 He objected both to the idea of a moratorium and to the lan-
guage of the proposed bill, feeling that the Supreme Court's expected decision in
the Rigid Steel case might dispose of many points said to be controversial, and that
the Myers Bill was vague enough to permit the reestablishment, entire, of the steel
industry's pricing practices before the Cement case of 1948. He called attention
to the study he had presented to the Johnson Committee,' 21 felt that the Commis-
sion had settled the matters about which confusion was said to exist,122 described
how steel union locals were being solicited by steel companies to support S. 236
and S. l008,12' and pointed out that stockholders were being urged to write their
Congressmen to the same effect. 2 '
The Federal Trade Commission view was represented by the Associate General
Counsel who had testified before the Johnson Committee on S. 23602' The views
he expressed were those of the Commission, with one dissent.' 20 The dissent was
included in the record in the form of a communication to Senator Johnson.' 2 ' The
Commission view in brief was that the adoption of the moratorium would increase
any confusion that might exist as to the meaning and application of the Federal
Trade Commission and Clayton Acts.'2 Although specific weaknesses of S. xoo8
might be cured by amendment and revision, the Commission's objection went to
the very idea of the moratorium itself, since any such moratorium would inevitably
120 Otis Brubaker, Senate Hearings on S. zoo8, at 39 iI.
' Id. at 21.
... Id. at 25.
2 3 Id. at 33.
12
' Id. at 34.
12 Robert B. Dawkins, id. at 69-82.
2
26 Id. at 69.
1
.Id. at 82.28 id. at 69.
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create a basis for further and additional uncertainties.12  The Commission witness
also felt that the Supreme Court might in the Rigid Steel Conduit case then pend-
ing clear up many matters about which uncertainty had been expressed.
The members of Congress who testified were Senators Myers and Johnson, and
Representative Walter of Pennsylvania. Senator Myers of Pennsylvania, like the
Commission and CIO witnesses, indicated that he was looking forward to the
Supreme Court's decision in the Rigid Steel case before considering permanent
legislation.130 The Myers moratorium had been proposed, said the Senator, because
the Johnson Bill (S. 236) dealt with a matter too complex for the Congress to dis-
pose of in speedy fashion.' 3 ' Although the Myers Bill suggested a two year mora-
torium, he was not insistent on this term. 32 Senator Johnson of Colorado took a
short time to bring the record of alleged Commission inconsistencies up to date,
including witnesses as recently as the day before, in the mood and the manner of
the Interim Report which bore his name 33 His most original contribution was a
classification which divided those who want to encourage competition, and those
who want no competition, with the Federal Trade Commission and the Supreme
Court in the second category' 3 4 Representative Walter of Pennsylvania supported
the proposed bill since he had introduced one like it in the House'33  There were
other witnesses, some of whom had appeared before the Capehart and Johnson Com-
mittees.'3 One of them, at least, seemed to have got into the wrong hearing
because he wanted to talk about advertising allowances as they affected dress
manufacturers, and thought that since moratoriums were in order, one might be
fashioned for his problems. He indicated that he would settle for advisory opin-
ions by the Federal Trade Commission "or somebody.' 3 7
V
... GEOGRAPHY COUNTS A LOT IN POLITICS"' 38
On April 27, the Myers Bill was reported favorably to the Senate, with an
amendment.3 9 The moratorium period was fixed by date (July I, i95o), and there
were changes in language designed to restrict the operation of the moratorium to
2 D Id. at 71.
2o Id. at 5.
231 Ibid.
23a Id. at 7.
a Id. at 85-89.
"'Id. at 86.
"OId. at 8.
... See, for example, George Burger, National Federation of Small Business, id. at 45; Angus Mac-
Donald, National Farmers Union, id. at 59. See also American Steel Warehouse Association, id. at 95;
Order of Railway Conductors, id. at 82; General Counsel Senate Subcommittee on Trade Policies, id. at 89.
"'ld. at 14.
..8 Senator Wiley, id. at 79.
23D SEN. REP. No. 305, 8xst Cong., ist Sess. (1949), 95 Cong. Rec. 5186 (April 27, 1949). Even
as amended, the bill was regarded by the Federal Trade Commission as neither necessary nor desirable.
See letter from the Commission to Congressman Patman of Texas. 95 Cong. Rec. A3 52 4 -A3 527 (May
31, 1949).
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the practice of freight absorption, without giving countenance to the systematic
use of basing point pricing. For example, the phrase "quote and sell at delivered
prices" replaced "use delivered price systems." An appendix to the bill contained
a brief citation of Supreme Court cases tending to uphold the constitutionality of
legislative overriders of Supreme Court cases, and it was the judgment of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, speaking through Senator O'Conor, that S. ioo8 was within
the constitutional authority of Congress to enact. There was, however, no state-
ment as to the Supreme Court decisions which S. ioo8 was setting aside. Senator
Langer of North Dakota dissented from the Committee report and recommenda-
tion,140 because the bill introduced at least four new terms and phrases in the anti-
trust laws without defining them. 4' It would, he said, have the practical effect of
immunizing various monopolistic practices which the supporters of the bill would
condemn; it would vitiate enforcement of the antitrust laws by substituting intent
for practical effect as a test of violation; and it would legalize basing point systems
and phantom freight through the uses that can be made of freight absorption.
Senator Langer concluded that Congress was invading the sphere of the judiciary,
and recommended that Congress either refuse to pass the bill, or amend it further
to protect the antitrust laws.' 42  His dissent from the majority report of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary laid the foundation for a strong attack upon the bill
when it came up for debate.
It came up for debate on May 31 when Senator Myers moved its consideration. 143
Those who might have been opponents of the legislation, those who might have
argued that Congress should let the Supreme Court work out the clarification
of any possible confusion, were disarmed by the Court itself. One hour after the
Senate Judiciary Committee had voted 7-2 to report the Myers Bill favorably to
the Senate, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Rigid Steel case 44
The Court had split four to four' 45  A half hour before the Myers Bill was to
come up for debate Senator O'Mahoney of Wyoming talked with Myers and others
about a substitute bill that he wanted to introduce in place of the one that the
Committee on the Judiciary had worked on' 46 An arrangement was made to
permit O'Mahoney to discuss his proposed substitute before final vote on the Myers
Bill. Senator O'Conor assumed charge of the Myers Bill, and the Senate proceeded
140 SE. REP. No. 305, pt. 2, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1949).
141 These were "engaging in competition"; "absorb freight"; "in any and all markets"; and "deliv-
ered prices."
142 See note 140 supra.
14095 Cong. Rec. 7155 (May 31, 1949).
Id. at 759. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 168 F. 2d 175 (C. C. A.
7th 1948), afl'd per curiam sub nom, Clayton Mark & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 336 U. S. 956
(1949).
14' "Perhaps as a result of this split decision sentiments in the Senate in favor of permanent legislation
in preference to a moratorium appears to have strengthened." Testimony of Herbert A. Bergson, Assist-
ant Attorney General, in H. R. Hearings on S. roo8, at ix.
.This was S. 1974, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. 95 Cong. Re. 7137
(May 31. 1949).
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to consider the measure which was now moot because of the expected O'Mahoney
substitution.
O'Conor's opening statement in explanation of the bill described the principal
features of the measure. He was not accurate in making a strong implication
that mere freight absorption as such was unlawful, or that the only pricing alterna-
tive available to businessmen under the law was f.o.b. pricing' 4 7 There was wide-
spread confusion, he said; the expected "clarification" by the Supreme Court in the
Rigid Steel case had not materialized; and it was now even more necessary than
ever for Congress to intervene. The intervention prescribed by S. ioo8 was a
moratorium until July I, 1950, on all proceedings against pricing practices except
those where conspiracy or combination was involved. There was to be no perma-
nent change in the law, and Congress was not committing itself to any particular
course of action or policy after the expiration of the moratorium. He made a point
of saying that the bill was not a "big business" bill but one that involved the entire
economy x4s Following the explanation, Senator Langer of North Dakota launched
an attack on the bill, in the main following the points that he had raised in his
dissent from the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on S. loo8, but adding new
matter of a general nature, in a text full of personal reminiscences. 49
The principal attack in this opening phase of the debate on S. ioo8 was made
by Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon. 30 He described the cross-pull and interplay
of pressures working upon Congress, master-minded, he asserted, by the steel com-
panies. The steel decision to go to f.o.b. pricing was not forced by the Cement case
because, as the Small Business Committee had reported in 1948 before the Cement
case, there had been a steady withdrawal of steel away from those markets where
freight was absorbed.' The Cement case provided a pretext to the steel companies
to get rid of costly freight absorption in a sellers market, he said, and shift the
blame for the change to the Federal Trade Commission. Moreover, this maneuver
transformed steel buyers into an "army of zealous supporters of the modification
of the law which the steel industry desired."' 52  He charged deliberate misrepre-
sentation of the Federal Trade Commission's position on these matters and denied
that the record showed any ambition on the part of the Commission to force enter-
prises to adopt f.o.b. pricing. He cited evidence to show that on June 2, 1948, at the
outset of the controversy, and in January, 1949, the position of the Federal Trade
Commission had been clear that the Cement case did not outlaw all delivered
prices or require only f.o.b. prices.' 3 He asserted that the propaganda line in favor
7 See 95 Cong. Rec. 7158 (May 3, 1949), where Senator O'Conor used language that made it
appear that the Federal Trade Commission felt that the Cement case made freight absorption unlawful.
He did not cite the express denial of this made by Commissioner Davis and referred to above.
8 Id. at 7159.
""
0 Id. at 716o ff.
... Id. at 762-7i69.
.. ld. at 7164.
'D3 Ibid.
... See p. 283 supra.
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of revision of the laws was perfected in the summer of 1948. The offensive phrase
"basing point" was discarded and the pricing practices of the steel industry were
represented as being no more than absorption of freight where necessary in order
to meet competition.154 It was his conclusion, as it had been that of Senator Langer,
that the blanket authorization in S. ioo8 to absorb freight for the sake of quoting
identical prices would legalize the entire mechanism of the basing point system.'
Langer had begun his speech on May 3. He yielded to Morse so that the latter
could get his speech in before he made a train. Langer resumed his remarks the
next day, finishing his attack upon S. ioo8 as sponsored by Myers. But the attack
on the Myers Bill was flogging a dead horse, for it was now evident that agree-
ment was going to settle on the O'Mahoney substitute, and Langer accepted the
substitute.' 50
The O'Mahoney Bill (S. 1974) had been referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary when it was introduced on May 3. The next morning, O'Mahoney met
with members of the Committee on the Judiciary and discussed his bill with them,
making some changes in it which he had not had time to incorporate in the text
by the time he arose on June i to describe his bill. The clerk of the Senate made
a notation of the changes as he described them. It was written in a hurry. It was
proffered to the Senate without hearings. The Myers Bill provided for a short
moratorium; O'Mahoney proposed moratorium forever. His substitute was a per-
manent revision of the antitrust laws so as "to declare that delivered prices and
freight absorption are not unlawful per se.'1 7 The champion of the antitrust laws
thus appeared as a champion of permanent amendment to the antitrust laws of a
kind that even the sponsors of S. Res. 241 and S. 236 had not dared to propose.
There have been various explanations of O'Mahoney's maneuver. One of the
most favorable interpretations is the suggestion that O'Mahoney figured that Con-
gress was in a mood to enact a serious renunciation of antitrust policy. In order
to avoid a more serious rout, he "preferred a strategic retreat in the form of a
compromise with the forces of monopoly."'"" Against this view, perhaps, is the
fact that the authors of S. 236 did not think that they could get their bill through,
and that the Myers Bill which the O'Mahoney Bill replaced was more moderate
than the O'Mahoney Bill, at least to the extent of being temporary and not perma-
nent legislation. A sterner critic suggested that O'Mahoney had "become a convert
to a different school of economic thought" from that he expressed as head of the
15 95 Cong. Rec. 768 (May 31, 1949).
... Senator Myers showed himself to be concerned over some of the implications of the Morse ex-
position of the activities of pressure groups. At the end of the Morse speech, Senator Myers wanted his
"friend from Oregon" to understand that no steel companies or any others came to Myers while the
bill was being prepared. 95 Cong. Rec. 769 (May 31, r949).
ld. at 7190 (June 1, 1949).
1 id. at 7204. The other of the two objectives of the bill was to "preserve the strength of the
antitrust laws."
... Letter to Congressman Wright Patman from Dr. Fritz Machlup, Johns Hopkins University, July 6,
1949, Small Business Committee Hearings on S. zoo8, at 212.
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Temporary National Economic CommitteeY 9 The most candid testimony as to
what O'Mahoney had in mind is the testimony of Senator O'Mahoney. On the
floor of the Senate, O'Mahoney said, 6 '
I should like to say to the Senator (Kefauver) that one of the purposes which I enter-
tained in offering this provision was to make sure that the system which has been used,
without criticism, by the sugar beet industry, of selling at delivered prices by absorbing
freight, should not now be disturbed.
His faithfulness to his mission as a Senator with important state economic inter-
ests to promote is evident in his further statement,'
I wanted to be sure that that great western industry was not being unduly affected by
the decision.
In the course of testimony he gave to the House Judiciary Committee in support
of his bill, Senator O'Mahoney also referred to the development of trona deposits
in Wyoming through the Westvaco Company, whose representative he had accom-
panied to the Capehart hearings. O'Mahoney at that time said that he proposed his
bill to clear up the law because he felt "it was essential that nothing be done to
prevent the investment of private capital in new industry in the United States.' '62
He had told the Westvaco Company representatives that he thought the law did
not compel f.o.b. pricing and that (absent conspiracy) the company could sell its
product in the market of any other company at a delivered price and absorb freight
in doing so. But no lawyer would advise the company so. O'Mahoney cited the
four to four split of the Supreme Court in the Rigid Steel case and indicated that
after that case it seemed clear to him "that we were erecting a barrier to the invest-
ment of private capital in the development of our natural resources and in the
development of trade and commerce."' 63  Beets and chemicals were clearly in the
mind of the sponsor of the substitute for the Myers Bill, whatever other aims might
have existed.
The Senate was patently confused, as the record shows. Some, like Senator
Tobey of New Hampshire, had come well prepared to fight against S. xoo8 in the
Myers version, on the ground that it would legalize or tend to legalize basing point
systems and make the problem of proof of violation of the statutes more difficult
for the Federal Trade Commission, or that lawyers might so argue and thereby
produce more eventual confusion than clarification' 6 4 Tobey felt that he was vot-
"" Testimony of Walter Wooden, Associate General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, Small Busi-
ness Committee Hearings on S. zoo8, at 68. See Senator O'Mahoney's speech before the Chicago Asso-
ciation of Commerce and Industry, June 22, 1949, as an example of the asserted conversion. 95 Cong.
Rec. A4289 (June 28, 1949).
100 95 Cong. Rec. 7211 (June 1, 1949).
101 ibid.
'
0 2 H. R. Hearings on S. 0oo8, at 4.
103 Ibid.
...See the long statement inserted in the Congressional Record by Senator Tobey, 95 Cong. Rec.
7211-7231 (June 1, 1949).
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ing for something different in the O'Mahoney substitute for the Myers BillP05 But
Senator O'Conor of Maryland, who was in charge of the Myers Bill, felt that there
was no substantial difference between the two except that the O'Mahoney proposal
would have made permanent what O'Conor and Myers had only dared to hope to
make temporary.""0 Senator Myers thought that there was no difference either.
As he said :117
When I introduced Senate Bill ioo8, in the nature of a moratorium, in the nature of
temporary legislation, I was hopeful that at least we might get that much action. How-
ever at that time I did not believe that it would be possible to get permanent legislation
through the Senate. However with the assistance and guidance of the Senator from
Wyoming, we are able to make permanent what we originally sought to make temporary.
I congratulate him for his efforts.
The Senate by a voice vote and with no real debate adopted the O'Mahoney Bill
as a substitute for the Myers Bill and then passed it, not as S. 1974, but as S. ioo8.10
"' "Therefore I wish to go on record as saying that I am opposed to the bill [i.e., the Myers Bill]
itself. I shall vote for the O'Mahoney amendment in the nature of a substitute." 95 Cong. Rec. 7211
(June 1, 1949)-
100 "We feel that the amendment as proposed by the Senator from Wyoming accomplishes exactly
what was intended to have been accomplished by the Committee on the Judiciary on a temporary basis,
but now is accomplished on a permanent basis by the suggestion of the Senator from Wyoming, as
amended in the several respects to which explanation has been given. Id. at 7231.
l
07 Id. at 7232.
..As it passed the Senate, S. ioo8 in Section i provided: "It shall not be an unfair method of
competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a seller, acting independently, to quote or sell
at delivered prices or to absorb freight: Provided, That this shall not make lawful any combination,
conspiracy, or collusive agreement; or any monopolistic, oppressive, deceptive, or fraudulent practice,
carried out by or involving the use of delivered prices or freight absorption." Ibid. The Clayton Act
as amended was further amended by adding that it "shall not be an unlawful discrimination in price
for a seller, acting independently" to quote and sell at delivered prices, identical at different delivery
points "or if differences between such prices are not such that their effect upon competition may be
that prohibited by this section." Similarly, it was not to be an unlawful discrimination in price for a
seller, acting independently, "to absorb freight to meet the equally low price of a competitor in good
faith (except where the effect of such absorption of freight will be to substantially lessen competition),
and this may include the maintenance, above or below the price of such competitor, of a differential in
price which such seller customarily maintains." The parenthetical phrase is the Kefauver amendment
referred to below, infra, note 171. Section 2(b) of the Clayton Act as amended was further amended
to read: "Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there has
been discrimination in price the effect of which upon competition may be that prohibited by the preced-
ing subsection, or discrimination in services or facilities furnished, the burden of showing justification
shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirm-
atively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided
further, That a seller may justify a discrimination (other than a discrimination which will substantially
lessen competition) by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any
purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the
services or facilities furnished by a competitor." The parenthetical phrase is also a Kefauver amendment.
Both amendments were designed to retain the rule of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Standard
Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 173 F. 2d 2io (1949), where the effect of price discrimination on
competition was held to overcome the defense of good faith. 95 Cong. Rec. 7211 (June s, 1949). At
one place, Senator O'Mahoney told Kefauver that he did not think that his bill (before the Kefauver
amendment) would "change the ruling under which the Federal Trade Commission now operates" but
he later admitted that the effect of his language would be adverse to the rule in the Standard Oil case
(Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 173 F. 2d 210 (C. C. A. 7th 1949)). 95 Cong. Rec.
7206 (June X, 1949). The fourth section of S. xoo8 contained definitions, one of which was: "The
term 'effect may be' shall mean that there is substantial and probative evidence of the specified effect."
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There had been no hearings on it. Some of the Senators obviously did not under-
stand what was happening. O'Mahoney gave only a very general kind of explana-
tion. In fact, some of the provisions were fashioned by question and answer. It
seems not to have been in existence forty-eight hours previously 69 It accomplished
overnight what Capehart and Johnson stopped trying to accomplish after a long
struggle of almost a year. The reputation of the Senator from Wyoming as a
champion of the antitrust laws seems to have been accepted as a guarantee of his
proposal.' 7° Only Senator Kefauver of Tennessee and Senator Long of Louisiana
showed signs of doubt. Kefauver got O'Mahoney to accept an amendment that
would have refused legal countenance to freight absorption which "will substantially
lessen competition."'' The effect of this amendment was to weaken the defense
of good faith, and to restore the rule of the Robinson-Patman Act that discriminatory
prices were unlawful (good faith or not) where they could not be justified by cost
differentials and tended to lessen competition. After the vote, Senator Long said
that he was inclined to feel "that when everyone is as happy about a piece of legis-
lation as Senators appear to be, someone is going to be fooled when he wakes up
and sees what is in it."' 72 A subsequent motion on June 6 to reconsider the bill
was defeated,' 73 and on that day the O'Mahoney version of S. ioo8 was referred to
the House Committee on the Judiciary. 17 4
VI
FRom HoUsE TO HousE
The bill which was given no hearings at all before it was proposed to and passed
by the Senate, was given no hearings to speak of in the House. According to one
witness, the Judiciary Committee announced a one-day hearing which he heard about
"by the grapevine."'17  One accomplishment of the one-day hearing was to prune the
bill of the amendment that Senator Kefauver had had inserted. Although he accepted
the amendment on the floor of the Senate, 76 Senator O'Mahoney appeared a
week later at the House Judiciary Committee hearings to propose that it be taken
This would have reversed the rule of Federal Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37 (1948),
where it was held that a "reasonable possibility" of injury to competition could make a price dis-
crimination unlawful. See also Corn Products Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 324 U. S. 726, 742 (1945).
10 Congressman Walter said that the bill as it passed the Senate had been drafted by Assistant At-
torney General Bergson. 95 Cong. Rec. 9158 (July 6, 1949). At another time Senator Johnson of
Colorado said that the Federal Trade Commission was the source of the bill. 95 Cong. Ree. 1x49 I
(Aug. 11, 1949), and that Robert Dawkins was the author. id. at 11492.
170 See the comments of Senator Lucas of Illinois and Senator Myers of Pennsylvania to this effect.
95 Cong. Rec. 7232-7233 (June x, 1949).
171 Id. at 7211. The verb "will" was to be important. See infra, note 236, and pages 305-308.
'" Id. at 7132. Note that Senator Long was also in doubt and confusion as to what was taking
place. He said that even though he was in favor of the O'Mahoney amendment, on the voice vote, he
voted against the bill. He thought that the amendment improved the bill, a remark that is difficult to
comprehend.
1795 Cong. Rcc. 7391-7392 (June 6, 1949).
'"
4 Id. at 7457.
17 Angus McDonald, National Farmers Union, in Small Business Committee Hearings on S. roo8,
at 84.
170 95 Cong. Rec. 7211 (June 1, 1949).
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out.'77  Herbert Bergson of the Department of Justice also appeared and suggested
that the Kefauver amendment be removed' 78 While the foes of monopoly were
thus engaged in building up the defenses available to respondents charged with
lessening competition, Congressman Walter announced that the Federal Trade
Commission had authorized him to state that the Commission was not opposed to
the legislation,'79 although it had been opposed to the lesser regulation first pro-
posed by Senator Myers. It is perhaps a tribute to the leadership of O'Mahoney
that he had been able to join the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Com-
mission, Senators Myers, O'Conor, Capehart, Johnson, and McCarran, and Con-
gressman Walter in a consensus for his bill. Because of the weight of this influence
and the speed with which the measure moved through legislative channels without
adequate hearings, the critics of the O'Mahoney Bill could fight only a rearguard
action.'8 ° This they did in brilliant fashion, first in the House and then in the
Senate. They were caught unawares when O'Mahoney's substitute passed the Sen-
ate, but they fought literally from house to house, and won at the least a temporary
stalemate when the Senate failed to act on the conference version of the O'Mahoney
Bill at the end of the First Session of the Eighty-first Congress.
The first attack took place in the House Judiciary Committee. Although it
was evidently originally intended that the Subcommittee would hold hearings of
only one day to hear O'Mahoney and Bergson, opportunity was provided to Con-
gressman Wright Patman to make a statement.' 8 ' The occasion was the meeting
of the full Committee on the Judiciary under the chairmanship of Congressman
Celler of New York to decide what action it would take on S. io08. Before it went
into executive session on June 14 to decide to report the bill favorably, Patman
and three other Congressmen were heard. He urged the Committee to hold a
complete and full hearing because the bill, in his opinion, would "put a loophole in
the antitrust laws that a B-36 could fly through."'8 2 There was no other argument
he could make since the Subcommittee had already reported to the full Committee,
and the discussion of the merits was presumably foreclosed. There had never been,
of course, any public discussion anywhere on the merits. Congressman Jennings
...H. R. Hearings on S. zooS, at 9. A later discussion showed that the printed version of the
Kefauver amendment was not in the form the author intended. It had passed in a form more restrictive
of the Federal Trade Commission than he had at first thought. See 95 Cong. Rec. 11477 (Aug. xx,
1949).
"" H. R. Hearings on S. zooS, at 12.155 Id. at 6, 28. In an ambiguous statement, the Commission seemed to imply that the Kefauver
amendment needed to he eliminated or modified in order to make good faith meeting of the lower
prices of a competitor a complete defense to a charge of unlawful discrimination, although it did not
make elimination of the Kefauver amendment a condition of approval. See reference to a caucus be-
tween Congressman Walter and Commission Staff on June 7, 1949, in the letter of Commissioner Davis
to Congressman Walter, dated June 9, 1949, H. R. Hearings on S. zooS, at 6o-62.
' The Journal of Commerce, in an editorial of June 8, 1949, was suspicious of the approval ex-
tended to S. ioo8 by the Federal Trade Commission and of Senator O'Mahoney's sponsorship of the
permanent legislation. See H. R. Hearings on S. roo8, at 68.
...H. R. Hearings on S. zoo8, at 17 f9.
182 ibid.
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of Tennessee tried to get Patman shut off' 3 but without success.' 4  Much of the
questioning of Congressman Patman was heckling and argumentative. Congress-
man Robert J. Corbett of Pennsylvania, representing the Pittsburgh area, said that
he supported the bill because "business does ask for an immediate decision on
this problem,"' s5 and a Congressman from Peoria, "where a number of large, bulky
industries are operating," agreed with Corbett' With these statements, which
took an hour and a quarter, the Committee went into executive session and decided
to report the bill favorably.
The bill was reported to the House, June 21, 1949.' s7 The Committee report
recommended the deletion of the Kefauver amendment 8 s and spoke of clarification
when it should have spoken of reversal of the courts. The Cement case, the Rigid
Steel Conduit case, and the rule in the Standard Oil Company case were now all
involved, since the bill would have given new defenses to those practicing freight
absorption, making prices identical with those of competitors, and injuring com-
petition, so long as "good faith" was present. The Kefauver amendment at least
would have sustained the rule of the Standard Oil case. The O'Mahoney version
would have reversed the rule of the Standard Oil case. As to Rigid Steel, Repre-
sentative Walter said that the Federal Trade Commission was embarrassed to admit
that it had made a mistake in pressing for favorable judgment on Count II in the
Rigid Steel case.' 9 The O'Mahoney Bill would probably have inhibited the Com-
mission from proceeding against firms consciously paralleling prices, regardless of
the effect on competition, where deliberate conspiracy was absent.
On June 30, 1949, the Rules Committee of the House granted an open rule pro-
viding for three hours general debate on S. ioo8.' ° Representatives Celler and
Walter of the Committee on the Judiciary urged the granting of the rule, and
Patman opposed it unsuccessfully. The best he could do was make a speech warn-
ing the members of the House that S. ioo8 was on its way' 9' He was active in
another direction, however. As chairman of the House Select Committee on Small
Business, he undertook himself to hold the hearings on S. ioo8 which he said had
been denied to him and to small business groups. 92 And for five days, witnesses
made appearances before the Small Business Committee or sent statements attack-
ing S. 0OO8. Professional economists,193 representatives of small business organiza-
"S'Id. at 23.
...Id. at 24.
280 Id. at 31.
180 Id. at 35.
187 95 Cong. Rec. 8243 (June 21, 1949).
.e. H. R. REP. No. 869, to accompany S. xoo8, 8xst Cong., ist Sess. 1 (1949).
'"H. R. Hearings on S. ioo8, at 27.
110 95 Cong. Rec. D64o (June 30, 1949).
102.95 Cong. Rec. 8936 ff. (June 30, 1949).
'"' Celler of New York found this maneuver "unseemly" because the Patman Committee was not
a legislative committee, had no direct power to recommend legislation, and had no jurisdiction over
S. iooS. Jurisdiction was in the Committee on the Judiciary, of which Celler was chairman. 95 Cong.
Rec. 9x64 (July 6, 1949).
103 Small Business Committee Hearings on S. soo8, at 135, 212, 215.
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tions,"' wholesale and retail distributors,195 the National Farmers Union,' 0 the
American Trucking Association, Inc.,0 7 and staff of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion' 9 made a record of protest of 300 pages, the theme of which was that S. ioo8
would weaken the antitrust laws, cancel recent gains in the clarification of the laws,
create more confusion and litigation, make it easier for violators to justify infrac-
tions, and harder for the Federal Trade Commission to halt such infractions. Wal-
ter Wooden, Associate General Counsel of the Commission, thought that S. ioo8
would set back the Commission twenty-four years to the time of the Old Cement
case.
1
'
9
Having failed to prevent the granting of a rule to S. ioo8, Patman then sought
to delay the schedule of the Rules Committee in setting the time for the debate
on S. iooS, but failed in this also °° In the course of discussing the schedule, how-
ever, Patman was able to forewarn the House of the principal objections that his
select committee had developed. °0  He also kept the Appendix of the Congressional
Record filled with editorials and extended remarks showing the impact of basing
point systems on various geographical areas in the country.202 The rule was called
up as scheduled, and the House debate on S. ioo8 began on July 6, 1949003
The ignorance and confusion of the Congressmen in discussing the measure
were depressing 04 Brown of Ohio asserted that there had been "rather extensive
hearings" on the bill before the Subcommittee and then the full Committee on the
Judiciary,2 5 which was not so. Sutton of Tennessee said that he had talked with
the person in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice by
telephone the day before and had been told that the legislation was not necessary
at all. °6 The attitude of the Department of Justice was variously expressed, and
Walter of Pennsylvania asserted that Bergson had said that "it was absolutely neces-
sary" that the bill be enacted2 7 This dispute was settled only when Majority
"' Id. at 225.
... Id. at 3, 4, 9, 21.
106 Id. at 75.
... Id. at 102.
' Id. at 30, 141, 202.
...Id. at 36. Cement Mfg'rs Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925).200 95 Cong. Rec. 9029 (July 5, 1949). Majority Leader McCormack hinted that Patman's request
was tardy and that the bill might have been scheduled to Patman's satisfaction, had he been more
prompt in his request.
'"Id. at 9032 ff.
"
2
°Id. at A4 4 5x, A4452, A4477. See also 95 Cong. Rec. A3 518, A3542, A3558 (May 3, 1949).
Congressman Walter inserted a speech he made before the Pennsylvania Bar Association in which the
decisions of the Federal Trade Commission on pricing were found to resemble the philosophy of a
former Soviet Commissar of Justice. Special reference was made to Count II in the Wigid Steel case.
S. ioo8 was designed to combat the "Krylenko philosophy" represented by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. 95 Cong. Rec. A4454 (July 5, 1949).
203 95 Cong. Rec. 9157-9172 (July 6, 1949).
... Congressman Lyle of Texas made an accurate observation when he remarked that "Generally,
legislation coming to the floor under a rule is better understood than this particular bill." Id. at 9157.
205 Ibid.
5
o' Id. at 9158.
""The record of the hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary does not disclose such
a statement by Bergson. It does quote him as saying, "Insofar as the Department of Justice is concerned,
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Leader McCormack declared that the bill had the approval of the Commission, the
Department of Justice, the Bureau of the Budget, and the White House.0 8  Pat-
man said that O'Mahoney had "agreed to this substitute" (for the Myers mora-
torium) "only when the Kefauver amendment was added to it." ' The record of
course shows that he personally appeared before the House Judiciary Committee
to get the Kefauver amendment stricken.
The chief accomplishment of the House was to write in another version of the
Kefauver amendment after Patman failed to prevent the debate on the bill sched-
uled by the Rules Committee.21" Willis of Louisiana led the first attack to restore
the Kefauver amendment or another version of the amendment,2 ' but this was
defeated. 2 The second (and successful) effort to undo the work of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary in striking out the Kefauver amendment was led by Carroll
of Colorado.213 The object of the Carroll amendment, as of the Kefauver and
Willis amendments, was to deprive respondents under the Robinson-Patman Act
of the defense of good faith where differential prices to meet those of a competitor
(without differentials of cost) substantially lessened competition. Like the Kefauver
and Willis amendments, its effect was to retain the rule of the Standard Oil case
as decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals? 4 The Carroll amendment
was adopted by the Committee of the Whole House21 5 after a wearying debate in
which few were on the floor and the speakers complained about the noise.210 Since
the House passed S. ioo8 in a different form from the Senate, the measure was
almost certainly headed for a conference committee unless the Senate accepted the
House version.2'" This would have been true also if the Judiciary Committee
we have never urged the necessity or desirability of legislation with respect to the pricing practices to
which the present bill is directed." H. R. Hearings on S. zoo8, at xi.
20B 95 Cong. Rec. 9164 (July 6, 1949). Patman was of the opinion that the Department of Justice
was willing to restrict the operations of the Federal Trade Commission out of a sense of rivalry. Id.
at 9227. He could not understand why the Federal Trade Commission had changed its position. Ibid.
2
°"Id. at 9x58.
210 The vote on the rule was easily carried, id. at 9167, and the House proceeded to consider the
measure on its merits, with time divided equally between opponents and proponents for three hours.
Id. at 9x68.
21195 Cong. Rec. 9239-9240 (July 7, I949).
'taId. at 9250. It is of interest that 143 Congressmen out of the total membership of 435 voted
down the Willis amendment by a vote (on division) of 80-63.
223 Ibid.
21, 95 Cong. Rec. 9170 (July 6, 1949).
5 95 Cong. Rec. 9259 (July 7, 1949). The vote was 117-81. Where the Kefauver amendment
had used the words "except where the effect of such absorption of freight will be to substantially lessen
competition," the Carroll amendment said "except where such absorption of freight would be such
that its effect upon competition may be that prohibited by this section." Where the Kefauver amend-
ment used the words "other than a discrimination which will substantially lessen competition," the
Carroll amendment said, "if the discrimination is not such that its effect upon competition may be that
prohibited by this section." Compare Carroll amendments with S. ioo8 as it passed the Senate, supra
note 168. As S. ioo8 passed the House, the phrase "substantial and probative evidence" in the definition
of "the effect may be" had been changed to "reasonable possibility," thus restoring the rule of the
Morton Salt case. See note 168 supra.
2" See remarks of Christopher of Missouri, 95 Cong. Rec. 9256 (July 7, 1949), and White of Idaho,
id. at 9258.
... The House passed the bill by voice vote after a motion to recommit to the Committee on the
Judiciary was defeated. Id. at 9269.
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version of the measure had been adopted intact by the House, since that version
had eliminated the Kefauver amendment..
With the action of the House on the Carroll amendment, a sharp and fairly
definite issue was for the first time joined. There was now a line, on one side of
which the spokesmen for the Robinson-Patman Act could stand, and on the other,
the spokesmen for legislative intervention on behalf of the steel, oil, cement, and
building materials industries, all affected by recent decisions. The question was
not now the abstract one of basing point systems and required f.o.b. pricing, nor
freight absorption as such, nor moratoriums. After the action of the House, Senator
Long of Louisiana warned the Senate that he recognized the existence of a drive
to end the Robinson-Patman Act, and referred to a statement in the Journal of
Commerce which spoke of Celler of New York as the sponsor of such a drive. 18
A statement attributed to Celler suggested that the conference committee might not
have to take either the Kefauver or the Carroll amendments. 19 Long put the
Senate on notice that he regarded the issue as a serious one and was prepared to
make a fight on it.
On July 26, the Vice-President laid before the Senate the amendments made by
the House to S. loo8, and McCarran of Nevada moved that the Senate disagree
with the House and go to conference.22 This was quickly agreed to by the Senate,
and McCarran, O'Conor, and Wiley were appointed Senate conferees. Long and
Kefauver immediately protested the action, charging McCarran with violation of
an understanding to give notice to Kefauver when the conference vote would arise,
to permit them instead to move to concur in the House amendments.22' The
McCarran motion to send the bill to conference, sotto voce, almost succeeded in
preventing the Senate from debating S. ioo8 at all. Senate protocol, had McCarran
consented, would have nullified the vote to send the bill to conference. He, how-
ever, would agree only to a debate on Long's motion to reconsider, which is not a
debate on the merits22 The debate was held on August io, ii, and 12, and it
failed to persuade the Senate to recall its decision to send S. ioo8 to conference. "2
Before the matter was sent on its way to the House again with a request to appoint
conferees, Senator Lucas of Illinois said that had he known the bill was going to
cause so much trouble and take up so much time, it never would have got off the
calendar. He had been persuaded to take it off the calendar by Senator Myers of
Pennsylvania who had assured him "that it was a moratorium bill, which would
probably require a couple of hours."224 The weapon that McCarran had against
218 95 Cong. Rec. 93IO (July 8, 1949).
219 Ibid.
220 95 Cong. Rc. 10387 (July 26, 1949).2
1
1 Id. at 10387-10388.
.2 See discussion of this point by Senator Morse, 95 Cong. Rec. 11496-11497 (Aug. 11, 1949).
"The motion to reconsider was rejected August 12, 1949. 95 Cong. Rec. 11553-11589 (Aug. 12,
1949).
22L95 Cong. Rec. 11376 (Aug. 10, 1949). Senator Lucas on two occasions tried and failed to get
the debate limited by unanimous consent. He succeeded on the third attempt, but only after the
supporters of the motion to reconsider had developed their attack at length. Id. at 11400, 11471, 1510.
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the Long-Kefauver group throughout the three-day debate was the rule of the
Senate that a motion to table the motion to reconsider would have the effect imme-
diately of shutting off debate.225 This advantage was not pressed, however.
The familiar ground was traversed once again, the chief difference being the
new alertness of senators who had had the time and the inclination to inform them-
selves about matters upon which they had voted unknowingly when the O'Mahoney
substitution for the Myers moratorium was made. O'Mahoney expressed again his
interest in the development of trona deposits in Wyoming and his desire to make
sure that Wyoming concerns would be permitted to absorb freight and quote deliv-
ered prices.226 He also said that he thought his sponsorship of S. ioo8 was con-
sistent with his views when he was head of the TNEC. He said that he had been
glad to accept the Kefauver amendment when it was introduced originally and
hoped that it, or language like it, would come out of the conference committee
intact.2 7 He did not say that he had gone to the House Judiciary Committee to
urge its removal2 8 Senator Myers said that he had no objection to either the
Kefauver or the Carroll amendments but thought that the bill should go to con-
ference because there were such deep cleavages on both sides.2
29
The principal speeches in favor of the motion to reconsider the vote to send
the bill to conference were made by Senators Douglas, Long, Kefauver, Hill, and
Morse. Senator Douglas, especially, made the most coherent and logical exposition
to be made on either side of the controversy.23° He took the bold view that the
bill even with the Carroll amendment would legalize basing point systems, and
that although the Carroll amendments improved the measure originally introduced,
we would still be better off with no bill at all.231 The principal instrument for
the suppression of price competition is the basing point system, and this the
5
" Id. at 11377.
"'ld. at 11394.
"'I1d. at 11395-11396.
2.. At still another place in the debate, on August ii, Senator O'Mahoney again said that he had
accepted the Kefauver amendments in the Senate because he "believed they were totally in harmony
with the purposes of the author of the substitute." 95 Cong. Rec. 11489 (Aug. 15, 1949). He failed to
state at this time also that he had gone to the House Judiciary Committee to have the amendments
stricken.
220 95 Cong. Rec. 11398 (Aug. so, 1949).
..0 Senator Capehart was the originator of several short, sharp exchanges with Senator Douglas.
The first exchange ended with the following colloquy: Mr. Capehart: "If the Senator wants an argu-
ment and a fight I will be very happy to give it to him. The Senator seems to be inviting it." Mr.
Douglas: "I fight only in a good cause. If the Senator wants to take me on while I am defending
a good cause, I am willing." 95 Cong. Rec. 11401 (Aug. so, 1949).
" Id. at 1140o. He mentioned trade-marked consumer goods like chocolate bars and other candies,
chewing gums, cigars, soap, cosmetics, drugs, shirts, soft drinks and the like which sell all over the
country at the same price (indicating freight absorption) and are protected by trade-mark. As to these the
Federal Trade Commission had not proceeded against the uniform prices of trade-marked products and
there was no prospect that it would. These are different from the standardized commodities in which
there is little difference of quality, and price competition is the only kind that counts. Among the
latter are steel, cement, lead, steel pipe and conduits, corn syrup, beet sugar, some forms of lumber,
and brass. He said that the makers of the latter had been fighting behind the skirts of the first to
legitimatize their own monopolistic practices.
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O'Mahoney Bill, even with the House amendment, would sanctify.23 2 The alleged
confusion following the Rigid Steel case existed only in the minds of those sponsor-
ing the O'Mahoney measure and not in the minds of the courts or the Federal Trade
Commission. The fact that the Court split four to four in the Rigid Steel case need
not have made legislation any more necessary than the four to four split in the
Oregon minimum wage case in 1917.233 Any further amplifications or refinements
of statements about the law and its application should be undertaken by the admin-
istrative and the judicial processes. The present laws are adequate to deal with
the situation and new legislation is unnecessary.234
Kefauver of Tennessee repeated many of the points that had been mentioned
and developed some further.235 The O'Mahoney Bill he thought was unnecessary.
It added to and did not lessen confusion. But if it should be enacted, it should
contain the Carroll amendments. The junior Senator from Tennessee in fact thought
that the Carroll amendments were broader and provided more protection to small
business 23 than his own. Kefauver reviewed the cases which the O'Mahoney Bill
would affect (indeed, set aside) including the familiar five: Corn Product, Staley,
Cement, Rigid Steel, and Standard Oil-in short all of the cases in which the profile
of the law was becoming more and not less clear and certain.237 Like Douglas,
Kefauver hoped that the bill would be defeated. The minimum condition of
acceptance, he felt, should be the adoption of the Carroll amendments.2 8S There
was a strong implication that the Senators sponsoring the bill did not know what
they were doing when Kefauver said that the purpose of the measure was to
emasculate the antitrust laws, a purpose that the sponsoring Senators did not em-
brace, but which was the design of "the great lobby that is behind the bill."2 '
.. Douglas cited a letter written to him at his request by the Chairman of the Department of
Mathematics at Haverford in which it was estimated that the probability of eight identical bids in 102
counties was one in eight followed by 214 zeros. The Illinois Department of Highways in z947 had
received bids from eight cement companies which were identical within each of the 102 counties in
the state. Id. at 11403.
... Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U. S. 629 (1917).
23495 Cong. Rec. 11405 (Aug. 1o, 1949). The Kefauver and Carroll amendments would only have
"limited the bare-faced use of the basing point system," not made it obviously unlawful. Id. at 11408.
Capehart said that Douglas was confusing the right of individual sellers acting independently to absorb
freight with the basing point system. There is perhaps less confusion than overlapping between tie
two. Not all freight absorption is basing point in structure, but typical basing point systems involve
freight absorption. A bill making all non-conspiratorial freight absorption lawful regardless of effect
on competition could be understood to legalize basing point systems, as Douglas asserted. 95 Cong. Rec.
11412 (Aug. I, 1949).
5 5 5Kefauver's principal presentation is to be found in 95 Cong. Rec. 11475 f. (Aug. ii, 1949).
...Id. at 11477. When he first proposed his amendment Kefauver proposed to insert the words
"except where the effect of such absorption of freight will be to substantially lessen competition." He
then thought that the word "will" was incorrect since the word "may" customarily appears in antitrust
legislation, and substituted the word "may" for the word "will" in the printed copy of his bill. It
was adopted by the Senate with the word "will," however, raising a matter of some concern to the con-
ference committee when it looked for a version of the Kefauver-Carroll amendments that would be
satisfactory to both the House and the Senate.
2
" Id. at 11476.
... Id. at 11485.
230 Ibid.
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Hill of Alabama and Morse of Oregon made the last two speeches of importance
in favor of the motion to reconsider. Hill drew freely upon the views of witnesses
before the Patman Small Business Committee,24 and the reported views of the
Federal Trade Commission,2 41 the Department of Justice,2 42 and the press24
Morse of Oregon, although feeling that the bill would eventually pass into law,244
nevertheless conducted a vigorous attack upon it. He deplored what seemed to
him to be a breach of the usual senatorial practice when sentiment exists to re-
consider a vote by which bills are sent to conference. The customary practice he
had found was to permit reconsideration by unanimous consent, without debating
the motion.245 This courtesy had been withheld by the chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, who had originally called for a vote on sending the bill to
conference when Kefauver, with whom he had had an agreement to give prior
notice, was not in his seat.246  Morse wanted the record to show that the proponents
of the bill wanted to take refuge in the protection of a technicality in the rule. 47
Morse preferred the Carroll amendment to the Kefauver amendment because the
latter contained the inadvertent word "will" and he applauded Kefauver's forth-
rightness in accepting the Carroll amendment in place of his own2 4s He made an
exposition of the actual operation of basing point systems,249 thereby carrying for-
ward the excellent lecture given to the Senate by Douglas and others on economics.
He twitted O'Mahoney with a news release issued by the Senator from Wyoming
and dated July 1i, 1948, in which the basing point system was condemned, the reader
was warned that the steel industry would try to lay the basis for a demand that
Congress change the antitrust law, and the case was made for a good faith aban-
donment of the basing point system in favor of f.o.b. pricing25 0 He thought that
the news release left some in doubt as to how the Senator from Wyoming could
justify his position on S. ioo8.
On the last day of the three-day debate on the motion to reconsider, the time
was divided equally (under a unanimous consent agreement) beween the supporters
and opponents of the motion. Wherry of Nebraska led off against the motion to
reconsider by asserting that the bill (S. ioo8) had been used as a medium for
'.ld. at 11490, 11495.
'Id. at 11491.
2,2 ibid.
"'Id. at 11495.
"In a colloquy with Senator Douglas, Senator Morse said: "But I am sure the Senator from Illinois
will agree with me that the probabilities are that Senate Bill ioo8 will be finally passed by the Senate."
Id. at 11498. And again, "But I recognize that a bill is going to be passed, and therefore I am going
to do the very best I can to patch it up:' Id. at 11503.
'Id. at 11496.
". Id. at 11497.
2, Long of Louisiana was also absent, being "on my way to the Senate Chamber at the time the
motion was made." 95 Cong. Rec. 10387 (July 26, 1949). The agreement was made between McCarran
and Kefauver. Russell of Georgia had also asked McCarran to be notified. Long spoke of the "low
tone of voice" in which McCarran had put the motion to send the bill to conference. Id. at 10388.
",8 95 Cong. Rec. 11498 (Aug. 11, 1949).
..O Id. at 11498-115oS.
'"Ild. at 11508-11509.
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airing wholesale violations of the antitrust laws. He thought that S. ioo8 was de-
signed to restore the competitive conditions "which were revolutionized by the
Supreme Court opinion in the Cement case."25' The issue was a simple one, and
he proceeded to explain it in terms of horse trading on the farm. Douglas made
a summary of his previous speech 52 O'Conor of Maryland concentrated upon the
Carroll amendments which he thought meant to "amend the Robinson-Patman Ac*t
except in any respect in which it is in force."25 3  Among the authorities invoked
in favor of S. ioo8 was John D. Clark of the Council of Economic Advisers, de-
scribed by Johnson of Colorado as a great liberal who, although his father left him
a fortune, "did not become a playboy at all. 254
The suggestion made the day before by Morse, that Senator O'Mahoney was
professing a view inconsistent with that he held on July i, 1948, was further devel-
oped by Long.25" O'Mahoney maintained his position that S. ioo8 contained noth-
ing which affected the basing point system or the multiple basing point system.250
He argued that if S. ioo8 were defeated, steel could go back to f.o.b. mill prices
and then prevent any other state from developing a steel industry.25 7 It was put to
him that he had once said that it was best for the steel companies to go on an f.o.b.
pricing basis. O'Mahoney's answer was that the TNEC report had indicated that a
change in f.o.b. pricing must allow industry time for adjustment. He saw around
him now opportunities for new competitive enterprises to enter industry, and be-
lieved that they could not do it without being permitted to absorb freight.258
Sparkman of Alabama reviewed the history of the pressure which had been organ-
ized to produce changes in the antitrust laws by Congress.200 He paid special
attention to the effect of the abolition of the basing point system on the sugar beet
industry of Colorado, Wyoming, and other Mountain States and concluded that
the result would not be harmful to that industry in those states.2"0 This seems to
have been an appeal to the chief proponents of the legislation from important
sugar beet states, Johnson of Colorado and O'Mahoney of Wyoming. Pepper of
Florida developed the case against the basing point system with special reference
to Florida.26 With some further remarks by Long and Kefauver, the struggle to
25195 Cong. Rec. 11554 (Aug. 12, 1949).
"'Id. at 11557-,1559.
... Id. at 11563.
.. Id. at 11492. See testimony of Clark cited by O'Conor, id. at 11563. Long of Louisiana sug-
gested that Clark was one of the "great Standard Oil executives," who had been "one of the foremost
advocates of the legalization of the basing-point system itself" and that if the bill met with Mr. Clark's
approval that fact might "indicate that the bill might actually legalize the basing-point system." Id. at
11492.
...ld. at 11572.
"'I1d. at 11573.
57 Ibid.
258 Ibid.
... He also utilized the material reported by James W. Daniel, Washington correspondent of the
Rocky Mountain News, Dec. 17 and 22, 1948, describing the activities of an organization which set
out to produce a "grass roots demand" for change in the law. Id. at 11575.2
11 Id. at 11575-11578.
2 811d. at 11579-11582.
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get the Senate to reconsider the motion to send the bill to conference ended. It
was a struggle that had been waged in the main by Senators from southern and
midwestern states against Senators from the steel and beet sugar states.
Before the vote was taken on the motion to reconsider, McCarran undertook to
defend O'Mahoney, as Johnson had previously done 62 The McCarran statement
was notable chiefly for the suggestion that the O'Mahoney Bill was more anti-
monopolistic than "any bill which was likely to come out of the Committee on the
Judiciary after the year of study which was contemplated during the period of
moratorium" which the Myers Bill would have provided2 s The motion to re-
consider the vote to send S. xoo8 to conference was lost 28_49,264 and McCarran
was stopped by Langer of North Dakota in a maneuver to have O'Mahoney and
Jenner of Indiana added to the conference committee 65
VII
TmE CONFERENCE REPORT
The final passage at arms in the First Session of the Eighty-first Congress took
place over the conference committee report which was submitted in the closing days
of the session20 As reported by the conference committee, the compromise bill
was unacceptable to Celler, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, and Willis
of Louisiana2 67 It was acceptable to the three Republican conferees and one Demo-
crat, Representative Walter of Pennsylvania, who was on the high seas but had
cabled his proxy, not to a member of his party, but to a member of the minority
party26
S. OO8, as finally proposed in the conference report, amended the Federal Trade
Commission Act to provide that it should not be regarded as an unfair trade prac-
tice for sellers acting independently to absorb freight and quote delivered prices.269
Language withheld the benefits of the Act from any combination, conspiracy, or
collusive agreement, and from any monopolistic, oppressive, deceptive, or fraudu-
lent practice carried out by the use of freight absorption or delivered prices. This
2 Johnson had said, "The chemical industries of the West wanted to go ahead without further
delay. They had to have matters clarified so they could develop the industries they had in mind. In-
dustries wanted to get under way in Wyoming. They were demanding that the matter be settled.
They persuaded the Senator [i.e., O'Mahoney] they needed action at once and the present bill is the
result. Id. at 11573.
"'Id. at r1583.
2
"Id. at 11588.
" McCarran asked for unanimous consent to augment the number of Senate conferees and to add
Jenner and O'Mahoney, but Langer objected and unanimous consent was therefore not secured. Id. at
11589.
"s After the Senate action sending the measure to conference, the House insisted on its amendments,
agreed to the conference (95 Cong. Rec. 11811 (Aug. 16, 1949)) and appointed conferees, August 16,
1949. The conference report, H. Rep. No. 1422, was submitted to the House on October 14, 1949,
and debated. 95 Cong. Rec. 14786 (Oct. 14, 1949).
207 95 Cong. Rec. 14786 (Oct. 14, 1949).
... Michener of Michigan. Walter's views about the legislation were closer to those of Michener
than to either of the other two conferees of his own party. See Michener's statement, id. at 14794.
2 'Id. at 14794-14795.
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language had been included in both House and Senate versions of S. ioo8. The
Robinson-Patman Act was amended to make it lawful for sellers independently
to absorb freight or quote delivered prices unless the effect of these practices "upon
competition will be to substantially lessen competition." This was the version of
the Kefauver amendment that Kefauver had repudiated. Even where the forbidden
effect was shown, however, the conference report provided that good faith meeting
of the lower prices of a competitor should be a complete defense to a charge of
unlawful discrimination, regardless of its effect upon competition. It was therefore
possible for the Federal Trade Commission to prove a prohibited discrimination
to which good faith would be a complete defense.
The press reported (as the conference report indicated) that S. ioo8 would over-
rule the Seventh Circuit Court decision in the Standard Oil case, where a prohibited
effect upon competition vitiated the defense of good faith in a charge of unlawful
price discrimination.2 70 Moreover, language of the proposed bill required the Com-
mission to demonstrate illegal effects of price discrimination with "reliable, pro-
bative and substantial evidence." This threw out the rule of the Morton Salt case,
where the Commission had been required to prove only a "reasonable possibility"
that the effect of a price discrimination would injure competition unlawfully. The
general exemption extended to non-conspiratorial freight absorption would have
nullified the holding on Count II in the Rigid Steel Conduit case, and would have
weakened the theoretical basis of the Cement case, and the Glucose cases which
preceded it.
Carroll of Colorado supported Celler's objection to the conference report and
explained the circumstances under which the word "will" had come into the
Kefauver amendment instead of "may." He proposed that the report be recom-
mitted or that no legislation on the subject at all should be sought.27' Others felt
as Carroll did.272 Strong statements in support of the conference report were made
by Halleck of Indiana273 and Michener of Michigan.7 4 The proceedings were short,
and after a motion to recommit was lost,2 75 the conference report was adopted by
the House by a vote of 2ooIo4
y76
With the submission of the conference report to the Senate,277 the opponents of
S. ioo8 had picked up another ally-time 7 The Senate was in the last days of
the First Session of the Eighty-first Congress, and the Congressmen wanted to
expedite their business in order to get home. O'Conor was reported to be confident
17 %Vall Street journal, Oct. 13, 1949, p. 8, col. 2.
27195 Cong. Rec. 14788 (Oct. 14, 1949).
272 For example, Boggs of Louisiana, id. at 14789.
272Id. at 14789-14790.
2 Id. at 14794-14796.
271 Id. at 14797. The vote was 138-178, with 116 not voting.
... Id. at 14797-14798. There were 128 not voting.
277 95 Cong. Rec. 14983 (Oct. 15, 1949).
278 See 95 Cong. Rec. X5054-15055 (Oct. 17, 1949), where Lucas of Illinois arranged the schedule
of the Senate, including the conference report debate.
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that he had enough votes to push the bill through 79  The.pressure was so great
that the sponsors of the conference report actually managed to slip it through the
Senate in a Saturday night session with what Douglas described as "supersonic
speed."2 ' The action was recalled by the timely attentiveness of Douglas and
Long. The Senator from Illinois said that he and Long were standing close to
the Chair, but even then could not hear the question which was stated, "and we
were startled by the almost instantaneous announcement that the report had been
agreed to." This tactic was reminiscent of the manner in which the motion to
send the bill to conference had been maneuvered. If Douglas and Long had not
been watching for the Saturday night motion, the Senate would have enacted a
fundamental reform of the antitrust laws that had never had hearings in either
the House or the Senate, which few legislators understood, and which had been
put on the books by inadvertence.
The last debate on S. ioo8 began when Douglas objected to the conference report
in its entirety.28' He expressed the opinion that S. xoo8 legalized the basing point
system, the postage stamp and zone systems of pricing, and would produce a re-
versal of the entire policy of the government in the pricing field 2 In addition,
he felt that the bill really repealed the Robinson-Patman Act28 Hill of Alabama
contributed a recollection of William Jennings Bryan who once in a debate against
a tariff bill referred to the banyan tree which entices the unwary native to seek its
fruit only to be crushed by the powerful limbs of the tree s4 Capehart wanted to
talk about the Miller-Tydings Act which Douglas suggested was as relevant to
S. ioo8 as canasta. As he had warned in an early phase of his speech, Douglas
at its conclusion moved that further consideration of the conference report on
S. ioo8 be postponed until January 2o, 195o86 O'Conor immediately moved to
table the motion and on the yeas and nays, the motion was lost, 29-29, the Chair
indicating that its vote would be in the negative 87
The denouement was supplied by O'Mahoney who turned against the bill he had
sponsored, and gave his support to Douglas. He expressed his pleasure that the
Douglas motion was not laid upon the table,2 8 and he urged that it be adopted.
27 The Journal of Commerce, Oct. 18, 1949, p. 2, cols. 6-8. Senator Long told reporters that
Douglas would not filibuster, but that he had no objection to doing so. See also Journal of Commerce,
Oct. 19, 1949, p. a, col. 8, where mention is made of a sizable stack of books brought to the Senate
by Long.
280 95 Cong. Rec. S5115 (Oct. 17, 1949)-
281 Douglas got unanimous consent to hold the floor on October 17 and to permit him to resume
the debate the next morning, October x8. Id. at 1538.
2
1
2 Id. at x3565-15166.
2'85 Id. at 15167.
.. Id. at 15168. Douglas thought that this illustration was more graphic than the spider and fly
analogy.
281 95 Cong. Rec. 15168 (Oct. 1S, 1949)-
2" Douglas' first motion was to recommit the report to the conference committee with the request
that it report on January 2o, 395 o . This was ruled out of order since the House had already acted.
id. at 15173.1
.a d. at 15174.
288 bid.
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His principal point was that the conference committee version of S. ioo8 permitted
the Federal Trade Commission to proceed against prohibited forms of freight ab-
sorption only where the effect of the absorption will be to lessen competition sub-
stantially, not where there might be a reasonable probability of this result s8 The
committee had retained the original or inadvertent version of the Kefauver amend-
ment; O'Mahoney thought that the Carroll version was preferable. O'Mahoney
warned that if consideration were not postponed, he would have to vote against
the bill that he had introduced 9 ° The conference bill not only did not clear
away misunderstandings, but created fresh ones. O'Mahoney said that he had
always understood independent freight absorption to be legal and was glad to
have the recent opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of
Bond Crown and Cork Company v. Federal Trade Commission confirm this be-
lief. 91 He concluded by explaining why he had got into the controversy in the
first place-Wyoming beets and chemicals 2 ---but now felt that the conference re-
port version of his bill would work to the disadvantage of these industries by
"locking up the natural resources of the West in the hands of the monopolists."
This statement (perhaps it might be called "recantation") was documented by a
letter from Q'Mahoney to Mr. Robert D. Pike, in which the latter was assured that
the courts, the Commission, and the Department of Justice would continue to sup-
port the legality of independent freight absorption2 9
With the conclusion of O'Mahoney's speech, the opposition to Douglas' motion
collapsed. The Senate quickly agreed by voice vote to postpone consideration of
the conference report to January ao, 1950 94
VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The drive to amend the antitrust laws and overrule major decisions of the Fed-
eral courts was begun in the summer of 1948 when steel customers, and others,
stimulated by the new pricing policy of the steel industry, appeared on the stage
of the Capehart Committee and asked that Congress "clarify" the law on pricing.
The trouble was not really that the law was unclear but that it was becoming more
clear as the Federal Trade Commission and the courts applied the Federal Trade
Commission and Clayton Acts (as amended) to new situations. The principal
effect of the two measures to enact permanent amendment of these statutes-
S. 236 and O'Mahoney's S. iooS-would have been to set aside the new decisions.
A trend was to be stopped and perhaps reversed, not made more viable in the
directions freshly opened.
' Id. at 15174-I5176.
20Old. at 15176.
201 176 F. 2d 974 (C. C. A. 4 th X949). 95 Cong. Rec. 15176 (Oct. 18, 1949).
202 95 Cong. Rec. 15176 (Oct. T8, 1949).
' 1d. at 15179-15180.2
9
4 Id. at 1518o.
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After the somewhat elaborate propaganda prepared by the Capehart hearings
for a Congress that the voters did not elect, the effort to write a permanent statu-
tory amendment of the antitrust laws proceeded briefly, but was soon abandoned
because of the complexity of the problem and the desire of the proponents of
change for quick results. The Myers moratorium was to serve this desire. At the
critical point, however, the proponents of legislative intervention against the Com-
mission and the courts found themselves being led, to their joyful surprise, by
Senator O'Mahoney, who seems to have been influential in bringing along the
Commission and the Department of Justice also. If Kefauver had not amended
S. ioo8, however inadvertently, as it whisked through the Senate, one of the fastest
breaking squeeze plays in recent legislative history would have reversed develop-
ments in the law of pricing that had taken years to mature. The Kefauver amend-
ment slowed up proceedings in the House, made a conference necessary, and thereby
gave time for an opposition to crystallize and organize. Even with this small gain,
two strategems threatened to prevent the new opposition from placing its weight
against the insistent thrust to legislate. These were the maneuvers that almost sent
S. ioo8 to conference on tiptoe, and then almost whirled the conference report
through the Senate with "supersonic speed."
Few Congressmen seemed to know quite what they were doing, and on S. ioo8,
at least, there was almost no way for them to find out, since the O'Mahoney Bill
was given no hearings in the Senate and no public hearings in the House Judiciary
Committee. The only public hearings it received were held by a committee that
had no jurisdiction over the measure. The Capehart hearings were useless as a
basis for legislation. The residuum which the Capehart hearings leave is that the
witnesses, understandably, would feel uncomfortable in the dream world of re-
quired f.o.b. pricing that was imagined for them. The hearings on S. "236 were
perfunctory at best, and full investigation of alternatives was missing.
The Federal Trade Commission looked no more sure of itself at points than
some of the Congressmen. Under pressure, the Commission seems to have aban-
doned at least one position that it assumed before the courts, and permitted itself
to be reported as not in objection to the O'Mahoney Bill, although it had declined
to support either S. 236 or the Myers moratorium. Moreover, direct statements were
made in Congress to the effect that the Commission staff was responsible for lan-
guage in the O'Mahoney Bill. Without a full knowledge of all of the considerations
that seemed to be pressing and important, it is impossible to judge the necessity of
the Commission's choice. The student of antitrust policies may be permitted the
hope, however, that the Commission will not lose sight of the trust given it by
the statutes to carry forward, not backward, the enforcement of the laws governing
competition.
It need not be supposed that those who supported the O'Mahoney Bill were
willful wreckers of the antitrust laws, for the choices were not simple and clear-cut.
Few argued that required f.o.b. pricing was desirable. Most accepted the view that
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independent freight absorption made in good faith with no adverse effect upon
competition was desirable. But neither Johnson, Myers, nor O'Mahoney succeeded
in producing a bill to protect this kind of freight absorption without at the same
time lending countenance to practices that would be restrictive of competition, be
hard to detect, and be harder to prove. It is not difficult to understand that the
harassed Congressman, importuned by restless constituents, would prefer to risk
abuse of the law if he could protect the concerns of the innocent in intention.
Indeed, O'Mahoney himself seems to have made somewhat this kind of choice. The
alternatives, however, become a little clearer when it is established that the fears
are unfounded. One does not then have to assume the risk. This is the view with
which O'Mahoney started. It is the one with which he finished.
A reasonable case can be made for the proposition that the entire antitrust
policy of the United States should be reviewed candidly, re-formulated in the light
of sixty years' experience, and fitted to suit the requirements both of large scale
industry and the public in the middle of the twentieth century. It may be that
the complications swamp the benefits of legislation in the pricing field that is too
detailed and specific. Free enterprise is a valuable concept which certainly should
not be impaired by the very laws enacted to fulfill its promise. But the formulation
of new policy requires at the least comprehension of the issues, full hearing for all
relevant views, and an earnest effort in good faith to reach a new balance of inter-
ests. The movement to change the law on pricing in the First Session of the
Eighty-first Congress fulfilled none of these conditions.
